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INTRODUCTION

Over the past decade, the United States has engaged in a series of
formal and informal initiatives to encourage Japan to use its antitrust
laws to abolish bid rigging, attack powerful cartels, provide access to
trade associations and keiretsu, and dismantle fixed trade barriers.1
These initiatives hinge on a perception that Japan has unfairly and
unjustifiably inflicted damage on the United States economy.2 On numerous occasions, U.S. representatives have threatened economic
sanctions and sternly warned Japan that U.S. antimonopoly laws
would be used extraterritorially to achieve equity in international
trade and commerce.3 These aggressive overtures reflect a frustration
that Japan already has the law and legal infrastructure to address recurrent antimonopolistic acts and other trade practices that violate antitrust law, but has chosen not to enforce relevant laws and effectively
use the resources of administrative agencies. 4 The frustration is fueled, at least in part, by the sense that the negotiations during the
Structural Impediments Initiative (SIl), the Group of Seven (G-7)
1. See LAW AND

TRADE IssuEs OF TIM JAPANESE ECONoMy: AmERICAN AND JAPA.

NESE PERPECrivs (Gary R. Saxonhouse & Kozo Yamamura eds., 1986).

2. See e.g., H.R. 1051, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1992) ("Over the past three decades,
Japan has pursued industrial targeting policies that have effectively dismantled portions of
the U.S. economy. Japan used industrial targeting to eliminate or substantially weaken the
American auto, consumer electronics, color television, and semiconductor industries, leaving in its wake severely depressed communities suffering from joblessness and other social
problems. There are those who see this, not as a fair competition, but as part of a larger,

premeditated strategy to use economic aggression to enhance Japan's economic power at
the expense of the United States.").
3. The efforts and initiatives of U.S. trade representatives to reform the Japanese
regulatory policy will be discussed in the second part of this article. These efforts and

initiatives, it is argued, represent both formal and informal extraterritorial social controls.
See infra Part II.A. Extraterritorial social controls are specific attempts (e.g., suggestions,
demands, and threats) by one nation-state to influence and counteract normative deviance
in a foreign nation-state. Specific attention will be paid to the extraterritorial social control
of Japan's regulatory policies and enforcement strategies.
4. See e.g., Government-BusinessMission to Japan Focuses on UrgingAnti-CartelEn-

forcement, 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1561, at 522 (Apr. 16,1992) (stating
that law in Japan is adequate, but its commitment to enforcement is deficient).
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Meeting, various summit meetings, and the recent Trade Framework
talks made the U.S. position clear: unfair competition and trade practices must end.5
Unfortunately, U.S. trade representatives have had little success
in forcing extraterritorial reform. There are commentators who claim
that the transition from a Liberal Democratic Party hegemony to a
responsive democracy may be underway in Japan, but even with several notable antitrust prosecutions, there is scant evidence of lasting
antimonopoly reform.6 What accounts for the relative failure of U.S.Japan reform initiatives? The failure of the U.S. extraterritorial antitrust reform efforts, it will be argued, reflects a fundamental misconception of Japan's socio-cultural, socio-legal, and regulatory
traditions. 7 In misjudging and ignoring long-standing and deeply held
traditions, the U.S. has attempted to export a rule-based vision of law
and regulatory enforcement that is fundamentally at odds with prevailing Japanese regulatory practice and enforcement strategies.8
5. A series of reports that chronicled the efforts of the U.S.-Japan Working Group on
the Structural Impediments Initiative revealed a common understanding of bilateral goals
and objectives. See U.S.-JAPAN WORKING GROUP ON THE STRucruRAL IMiPELMeNS INi.
TIATIVE (S ), INTERIM REPORT AND AssnssmENr, Apr. 5, 1990 (For example, the Japan
Working Group agreed that the JFTC would take the following actions: (1) resort to more
formal actions; (2) ensure greater transparency; (3) increase its budgetary allocation for
investigations; and (4) increase the number of criminal prosecutions). For similar statements of intention, see U.S.-JAPAN WORKING GROUP ON THE STRucTURAL In
IMtE"rs
IrhATrVrE (SI), Jornr REPORT, June 28, 1990; U.S.-JAPAN WORKING GROUP ON THE
STRUCTURAL ImEDImNTS INrTIATV (SIl), Fmsr ANNUAL REPORT, May 22,1991; U.S.JAPAN WORKING GROUP ON THE STRucruRAL ItPDInmNTs INrrIATIVE (SII), STRucTURAL IMPEDIMENTS INrrIATIVE JOINT STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD, Mar. 13,1992; U.S.JAPAN WORKING GROUP ON THE STRucruURAL hPEDBIMENTS INrMlATIVE (SI), SECOND

ANNUAL REPORT, July 30,1992. For a review of the Sfl, see Mitsuo Matsushita, The Struc-

turalImpediments Initiative: An Example of BilateralTrade Negotiation,12 MicH. J. INT'.
L. 436 (1991); Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., CurrentDevelopments in Japanese Competition Law
Anthmonopoly Act Enforcement Guidelines Resultingfrom the StructuralImpediments Initiative, 60 ANrrUsT L.J. 279 (1991).
6. For a discussion of existing antimonopoly law and law enforcement in Japan, see
HIRosM ODA, JAPANESE LAw (1992); Mrrsuo MATsmHsmTA & THomAS J.
SCHOENBAum, JAPANESE INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVEsTMENr LAw (1989); ELLIOT

J. HAIiN, JAPANESE BusINEss LAW AND TmE LEGAL SYsrEm (1984).
7. See infra Part IV.B-C.
8. This argument is far from new. The difference between the U.S. and Japanese
regulatory culture has been the topic of numerous commentaries, including an informative
symposium in the Cornell International Law Journal. See Frank K. Upham, Introduction

to 22 CORNEL INT'L LJ.375 (1989). For a summary of the cultural perspective, see John
0. Haley, Luck, Law, Culture and Trade.- The Intractabilityof United States-Japan Trade
Conflict, 22 CORNm.L INT'L LJ. 403, 416 (1989) [hereinafter Haley, Luck, Law, Culture,
and Trade] ("American trade policy has been predominately a matter of coercive legal
regulation while the Japanese approach has been one of informal, consensual restriction.");
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Most important, extraterritorial initiatives have overlooked powerful
normative controls, already in place in Japan's regulatory culture, that
may support corporate and industry compliance with existing laws. 9
In the first section of this article, we consider the effort by the United
States to assert extraterritorial social control (ESC) in Japan. The focus is on the incongruence between U.S. and Japanese regulatory policy and practice. In the second part, we present a model of Japanese
socio-cultural tradition that underwrites the effectiveness of consensual governance. Finally, in the third part, we suggest the need for a
different approach to U.S.-initiated extraterritorial control and propose strengthening extraterritorial initiatives that promote corporate
and industrial self-regulation. 10
H.

REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT AND

EXTRATERRITORIAL SOCIAL CONTROLS
One view of Western metaregulatory theory, in the ideal, assumes
that organizational compliance is a function of a regulator's capacity
and willingness to impose sanctions. 1 The potential for graduated
regulatory responses empowers an agency to engage in both passive
and active deterrence. Pyramid regulatory enforcement, as proposed
by Ayres and Braithwaite, pushes regulation down and maximizes
compliance and cooperation. 2 Deterrence is maximized where a titfor-tat strategy is used; where there is access to a hierarchical range of
John 0. Haley, JapaneseAntitrust Enforcement: Implicationsfor United States Trade, 18 N.
Ky. L. REv. 335 (1991) [hereinafter Haley, JapaneseAntitrust Enforcement]. For a fascinating account of Japanese legal culture, see MASAUI CHIBA, LEGAL PLURALISM: To.
WARD A GENERAL THEORY OF JAPANESE LEGAL CULTURE (1989).

9. This observation reflects the central argument of this article, which stands in sharp
contrast to prior discussions of legal and socio-cultural differences. We argue in favor of
using existing informal controls and normative constraints, embedded in the regulatory
culture of Japan to promote compliance with existing antimonopoly law. Other commentators have argued, almost without exception, for a strengthening of law enforcement
through the erection of formal social controls. See, e.g., John 0. Haley, Administrative
Guidance versus FormalRegulation: Resolving the Paradox of Industrial Policy, in LAw
AND TRADE ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY: AMERICAN AND JAPANESE PERSPEC.

107, 114 (Gary R. Saxonhouse & Kozo Yamamura eds., 1986) ("The availability and
certainty of sanctions for failure to comply with government policies is therefore the single
most important factor in determining the outcome of informal law enforcement.").
10. See infra Part IV.B.
TIVES

11. See NEAL SHOVER ET AL., ENFORCEMENT OR NEGOTIATION: CONSTRUCTING A
REGULATORY BUREAUCRACY (1986); JOHN BRArTHwAITE, To PUNISH OR PERSUADE:
ENFORCEMENT OF COAL MINE SAFETY (1985).

12. See

IAN AYRES

&

JOHN BRArrHWArlE,

RESPONSIVE

REGULATION:

TRAN-

SCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); John Braithwaite, Enforced Self Regula-

tion: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control, 80 MxCH. L. REv. 1466 (1982).
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sanctions and interventions; and where the height and shape of the
sanction function (i.e., the height of the pyramid) is consistent with
the desired compliance and regulatory environment. 13 The theory is
entirely intuitive: compliance is a function of the capacity for regulatory escalation and the potency of sanctions. The range and nature of
regulatory sanctions and strategies determine successful regulation.
In actual practice, the notion of responsive regulation is complicated by a host of structural variables that mediate the effectiveness of
regulatory strategies and sanctions, (e.g., a firm's economic
strength). 4 Responsive regulation is further determined by discretionary agency decisionmaking, the extent to which prevailing law requires active or passive regulation, and existing market regulation.15
Even with a long list of qualifications, however, one must accept the
idea that regulatory compliance in the United States is maximized
when an agency has an explicit enforcement strategy and where sanctions can be escalated or de-escalated in relation to an organization's
or industry's responsiveness. Tied to this notion of hierarchically escalating sanctions is the idea that, depending on the industry, prevailing
customs, and market forces, self-regulation should be replaced with
enforced self-regulation and the imposition of increasingly more significant legal or -administrative interventions where noncompliance
continues. In theory and practice, self-regulation in the context of cooperative mediation is preferred until agencies must resort to the
threat of the "benign big gun."' 6
Models of enforcement pyramids capture the power of combining
hierarchical strategies and sanctions. Successful integration of these
strategies and sanctions, however, require rule-based administrative
and regulatory environments. Pyramid models presuppose reliance
on law, rules, and sanctions to deter individual and illegal activity.
Rule-based approaches lose effectiveness in regulatory environments
13. AYREs & BRArrHwAn-E, supra note 12, at 40-41.
14. PETER C. YEAGER, THE LhinS OF LAv. THE PuBLIc REGULATION OF PRIVATE
POLLUTION 47-49 (1991); ST-EPmN BREYER, REGULATION AND Irs REFoRm (19S2).
15. PHnIPPE NoNarr & PIuP SELZNcK, LAW AND SocIY IN TRANsTIoN: ToWARD RESPONSIVE LAW

(1978);

JAY

A. SIGLER,

INTERACTIVE CORPORATE COMtPLIANCE:

AN ALTERNATIvE To REGULATORY CoMPULsION (1988).

16. AYREs & BRArmWAI, supra note 12, at 40. None of this is to suggest that the
prevailing paradigm in the West is an exclusive reliance on law and rule-based deterrence.
As commentators have noted, most administrative regulation in the U.S. remains informal.
See Haley, supra note 9, at 112-14. Negotiation and compromise are still the primary tools
of regulators. The difference between Japan and the U.S., however, is the role of law,
sanctions, and coercive authority. It is with repeated noncompliance that significant differ-

ences appear.
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that are characteristically informal, mediator-centered, and consensus
driven. After all, escalating threats and tit-for-tat sanctions are not
the every day ingredients of consensus-based dispute resolution. As
many commentators have noted, Japan's administrative agencies
rarely resort to the use of coercive authority. 17 Agencies most often
ask for consent from those affected by administrative policies. Consensus-driven negotiations between trade ministries and industrial associations, for example, lead to the formulation of policy and informal
enforcement strategies. 18 Law and law enforcement accordingly
"function in large measure as consensus-building processes rather
than avenues for command and coercion."' 9 The result is a consensual governance that reflects administrative authority without the
threat of coercive power and without resort to legal sanctions. According to one commentator, Japanese industrial policy is the enshrinement of bargaining and negotiation.20
Consensual governance, without the threat of escalating sanctions, is achieved in part through administrative guidance (AG) (gy6sei shid5).2 ' AG is a form of consensual persuasion practiced by
governmental agencies since the beginning of the Meiji era (18681912).2 There are at least three types of AG: (1) guidance authorized by statute which allows for the issuance of recommendations
(kankoku), (2) guidance issued under regulatory statutes that may
provide more formal mechanisms such as orders or Ecense requirements, and (3) guidance not authorized by statute, but rather under
the law establishing a particular ministry. This third form of AG pro17. See, e.g.,
FRANK K. UPHAm, LAW AND SOCIAL C14ANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN 207

(1987) ("Informality allows the control of social interaction, whether by private groups, the
bureaucracy, or the judiciary, to be particularistic so that consensus can form the basis of
dispute resolution.").
18. For a recent discussion of consensual policy formulation, see Steven M. Spaeth,
IndustrialPolicy, ContinuingSurveillance, and Raised Eyebrows: A Comparison of Infor-

mality in Administrative Procedure in Japan and the United States, 20 OHIO N.U. L. REv.
931 (1994).
19. JOHN 0. HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHoUT POWER: LAW AND TiS JAPANESE PARADox 198 (1991). Commentators, such as Frank Upham and John 0. Haley, paint idealized
portraits of two different visions of law and authority in the United States and Japan.
20. Michael K. Young, Judicial Review of Administrative Guidanc.I: Governmentally
Encouraged ConsensualDispute Resolution in Japan, 84 COLUM. L. Rnv. 923, 941 (1984).
21. See John 0. Haley, The Oil CartelCases: The End ofan Era, 15 L. JAPAN 1 (1982);
Wolfgang Pape, Gyosei Shido and the Antimonopoly Law, 15 L. JAPANI 12 (1982).
22. Mrrsuo MATSUSHITA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND COMPETTION LAW IN JAPAN
59-61 (1993).
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vides regulatory guidance to ministries, allows for the promotion and
support of industries, and harmonizes conflicting interests.
Notwithstanding persistent allegations of antitrust violations by
the United States, AG has been effective in ensuring regulatory compliance, most often without resort to legal measures. 4 At least four
reasons have been offered that may account for this. First, there is a
strong appreciation in Japan that the interests of the government override those of any individual, organization, or industry. Second, AG
reflects generally accepted organization and industry willingness to
build consensus (ringi-sei) with governmental ministries. Third, the
reciprocal nature of favors in Japan promotes strongly dependent industry-ministry relations. Finally, AG is far more flexible than formal
legal mechanisms. 26 With AG, the focus is squarely on achieving government-industry harmony through consensual administrative
management. 27
23. See Young, supra note 20, at 940 ("Bureaucrats consult with involved parties
before regulation both to build a consensus and, on occasion, to elicit the cooperation of
the regulated parties. Administrative guidance issued without such consultation may meet
with disobedience and, in rare instances, litigation.").
24. For a discussion of the effectiveness of Japan's industrial regulatory policy, see
Haley, JapaneseAntitrust Enforcement, supra note 8, at 356 ("Japanese reliance on informal, social controls to regulate social and economic behavior may also seem peculiar to
American eyes. Nonetheless, Japanese law enforcement authorities, including Japanese
FTC officials, testify to their effectiveness."); Mitsuo Matsushita, The Legal Framework of
JapaneseIndustrialPolicy, 58 B.Y.U. L. REv. 541,544 (1987); HAHN, supra note 6, at 117
("[AG's] uniqueness is due to the high degree of compliance obtained by a ministry of the
Japanese government through its requests to industry even though its legal authority to act
is frequently questionable at best."). Cf. Iyon Hiroshi, Antitrust and IndustrialPolicy in
Japan.: Competitionand Cooperation,in LAw Am TRADE ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE EcoN-

oMY, supra note 1, at 56, 60 ("The government-business relationship in Japan has resulted
in restriction rather than promotion of competition .... "); Haley, supra note 9, at 121
("[A]dministrative guidance is too pliable an instrument of enforcement to compel industry cooperation."). An excellent account of the limits of AG, contrasting the Sumitomo
Metals incident and the Oil Cartel cases, is found in Frank K. Upham, The Legal Framework ofJapan'sDecliningIndustries Policies: The Problem of Transparencyin Administrative Processes,27 HARv.IN'L LJ.425 (1986).
25. See Lawrence Repeta, The Limits of Administrative Authority In Japan: The Oil
Cartel CriminalCases and the Reaction of MITI and the FTC, 15 L JAPAN 24 (1982).
26. See Yoriaki Narita, Administrative Guidance, 2 L. JAPAN 45 (1968); Kenji
Sanekata, Administrative Guidance and the Antimonopoly Law-Another New of the Oil
Cartel CriminalDecisions, 15 L. JAPAN 95 (1982).
27. See Pape,supranote 21, at 12; Young, supranote 20, at 84; Takashi Wakiyara, The
Natureand Tools of Japan'sIndustrialPolicy,27 HARv. INr'L LJ.467 (1986); Mitsuo Matsushita, The Legal Frameworkof Trade and Investment in Japan, 27 HARv. IN 'L J.361
(1986). These authorities point out weaknesses in AG including: A lack of transparency;
the fact that AG is less powerful now that many large, global corporations have become
increasingly independent; compliance with AG is voluntary; too much deference is given to
AG by the courts; the flexibility of AG leads to discretionary regulation.
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Extraterritorial Social Controls (ESCs)

For many years commentators have noted the stark differences
between the regulatory efforts, mechanisms, and processes in the
United States and Japan.2 In discussing the extraterritorial application of U.S. law, scholars have obsessed over issues of jurisdiction,
comity, and sovereignty. This is so although the United States has
rarely exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction successfully. 29 At the
same time, scant attention has been paid to the extraterritorial assertion of social control. Extraterritorial control initiatives may be traced
to the mid-1960s when the United States began exerting pressure on
Japan to vacate trade and investment restrictions, and thus allow access to its markets.3" Throughout the 1970s and 198&;, the focus was
on the efficacy of voluntary export restraints. 31 Beginning with the
Reagan administration, the U.S. engaged in a concerted campaign to
change Japanese regulatory policy through a wide range of extraterritorial social controls (ESCs)-extraterritorial warnings, pressure, demands, and threats.32 ESCs may be defined as specific efforts or
initiatives by one nation-state to define, respond to, and assert control
over the regulatory procedures and practices of another nation-state.
ESCs appear as unilateral or direct controls (i.e., initiatives from one
nation-state directed at another nation-state).3 3 Alternatively, ESCs
appear as a variation of third party social control-an effort by a party
(United States) to influence or manipulate the actions of a second
party (a relevant ministry) through a third party (threats of legal action against a Japanese corporation).' With few exceptions, ESCs are
28. Legal scholars have justifiably cautioned against forming sterzotypic images that
draw distinctions that are more apparent than real. See UPHAM, supra note 17.
29. See A.V. LowE, ExTATEmrroAL JURISDICr0ON (1983); JAMES B. TOWNSEN ,
ExmRATERmurOIAL ArrusT: THE SHRM.A ANTITRusT ACr AND U.S. BUSINESS
ABROAD (1979).

30. See LAW AND TRADE IssuEs OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY, supra note 1. See also

Upham, supra note 8, at 375. Upham notes that the first U.S.-Japan trade dispute occurred
in 1856, when Townsend Harris demanded that Japan open its markets.

31. Voluntary export restraints (VERs) bear some resemblance to ESCs that call for
third party control. With VERs, the Japanese government mediates the interests of the
U.S. in relation to the affected industry in Japan. For a discussion of VERs, see Mitsuo
Matsushita, A Japanese View of U.S. Trade Laws, 8 Nw. J. INr'L L. & Bus. 29 (1987).

32. It should be noted that the conceptualization of ESCs originates in this article.
33. Unilateral control refers to the singular direction of control. "Thisis in contrast to
Horwitz's conceptualization of unilateral control as an aggressive or confrontational response in an escalation of social control. See ALAN V. HORWrrZ, Tins. LOoIC OF SociAL
CONTROL 127 (1990).
34. JACK P. GIBS, NORMS, DEVIANCE, AND SOCIAL CONTROL: CONCEPTUAL MATTERs (1981); JACK P. GIBBS, SOCIAL CONTROL: VIEWS FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
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designed as coercive leverage to force administrative agencies, such as
Japan's Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) and Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITE), to promote the transparency of AG, shift
allocation of regulatory resources, and increase the reliance on law,
law enforcement, and legal sanctions as means of assuring regulatory
compliance. ESCs squarely target both internal and external policymaking.35 ESCs range in formality and intensity from suggestions
for regulatory reform or law enforcement to threats of legal sanctions.
The most formal, albeit rarely used, ESC is an extraterritorial legal
action and sanction. ESCs also vary in frequency and duration from
threats of economic sanctions associated with short deadlines to longstanding pressure to engage in substantive law reform. Examples of
the range of ESCs appear in Table 1.
(1982). The elements of ESC differ from the orthodox styles of social control described by
Black and Horwitz. ESCs attack the regulatory non-conformity of a nation-state through
the use of a wide range of informal and formal initiatives. The differences with other styles
of social control, in terms of harm, liability, goal, and solution, are contrasted below.
Elements of Styles of Social Control
PENAL

COMPENSATORY

ConjATotRY THPEtmruc

ExrmAT.PwoRLAL

HARM

Value

Material

Relational

Individual

Group

Shared

Personality
None

Non-conformance

L.LuimrY
GoAL

Retribution
Punishment

Settlement

Reconciliation

Normality

Conformity

Payment

Negotiation

Treatment

Coercion to Force

SoLTION

Nation-state

Reform

35. See Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas, Making Policy in Regulatory Bureaucracies, in MAKING REGuLATORY PoLIcy (Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas eds., 1989).
Hawkins and Thomas, in referring to the work of Colin Diver, make a critical distinction
between external policymaking (i.e., rulemaking that governs the conduct of regulated industries and methods of law enforcement) and internal policynaking (i.e., allocation of
agency resources and rules for regulatory discretion). See also Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigmsin Administrative Law, 95 HARv. L. REv. 393 (1981).
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Table 1
Range of ESCs
SUGGESTIONS

PRESSURE

U.S. suggests
that Japan make
revisions to
Antimonopoly
Law by
abolishing
exceptional cases
and exclusions.36

Strongly
worded
requests by
the U.S. for
JFrC
investigation
of insurance
keiretsu.37

1.

THREA7S
U.S. demands that U.S. threatens to
Japan raise fines invoke unilateral
for the violation sanctions for failure
of antitrust laws, to enact additional
as part of a "20
market opening
point" demand
procedures and
for antitrust
increase
38
antimonopoly40
reform.
U.S.
enforcement.
demand for
investigation of
glass market by
IFrc. 3 9
I

LEGAL ACMION

DEMANDS

United States
suit against
Japanese
construction
companies for
bid rigging,
price fixingand
swindling.""

I

Context for ESCs

Extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law provides a context and premise for ESCs.42 After the landmark decision of United
States v. Aluminum Co. ofAmerica (Alcoa),43 American antitrust laws

have been extended, albeit rarely, to those non-American corporations that have a substantial and intended effect on American trade
and commerce." Agreements made outside the United States that re36. United States PressesJapan to End Antimonopoly Law Exclusions, Int'l Bus. Daily
(BNA), Apr. 22,1992, availablein LEXIS, News Library, BNAJBD File; U.S. Seeks Tighter
Steps Against Bid Rigging, Jiji Press Ticker Service, Aug. 8, 1994, available in LEXIS,
World Library, Jiji File.
37. Japan Denies JFTC Probe Into Insurance 'Keiretsu,' Grouping, Japan Economic
Newswire, Oct. 2, 1994, availablein LEXIS, World Library, JEN File,
38. U.S. Making a 20-point Demandfor StructuralChanges by Japan, Int'l Bus. Daily
(BNA), Mar. 11, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, IBDBNA ille.
39. Japan, U.S. to Continue Glass Trade Talks, Japan Economic Newswire, Aug. 31,
1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, JEN File.
40. Hosokawa Urges U.S. to Withhold Sanctions, Jiji Press Ticker Service, Feb. 18,
1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Jiji File.
41. 53 JapaneseConstructionFirms FaceJusticeDepartmentChargesof Bid Rigging,67
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1681, at 350 (Sept. 22, 1994).
42. See Thomas W. Dunfee & Aryeh S. Friedman, The ExtraterritorialApplication of
United States Antitrust Laws: A Proposalfor An Interim Solution, 45 Oruo ST. L.J. 883
(1984) (arguing that extraterritorial assertion of antitrust laws must balance the political
and economic interests of both forum and affected nations); Note, ExtraterritorialApplication of United States Law: The Case of Export Controls, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 355 (1984).
43. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). See John M. Raymond, A New Look at the Jurisdiction in Alcoa, 61 AM. J. INT. L. 558 (1967).
44. For a general review of the reach of antitrust laws, see Lown,supra note 29. For
an outstanding review of extraterritoriality, tracing the law from American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909) to Alcoa and TimberlaneLumber Co. v. Bank ofAm.,
549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), remanded,574 F. Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983), affd 749 F.2d
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strain trade within its borders, according to the court in Alcoa, have
the same effect as like agreements entered into in the United States.
Over the last several decades, the "intended effects" test has been limited by considerations of comity as well as fairness. Most courts now
apply some variation of a "jurisdictional rule of reason" standard. 4 5
Such a standard balances U.S. interests in exercising jurisdiction
against the interests of the foreign nation-state.4 6 Notably, the recent
success of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATr) may affect the application of this standard, as well
as Department of Justice policy regarding extraterritorial use of law.47
There are no comparable or analogous standards for the application of informal ESCs. United States trade representatives do not
have to balance domestic trade interests with those of Japan when encouraging, pressuring for, or demanding increased vigilance in antitrust enforcement. Rules of reason and fairness are not required. The
1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985), see A.D. NA.E & M.L SmnmEs,
INlmRNATIONAL BusNEss AND NATIONAL JURISDIOrION (1988).
45. See, e.g., Tnberlane, 549 F.2d at 597; Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.,
595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979). For an excellent treatment of the rule of reason test, see
Seung Wha Chang, ExtraterritorialApplication of U.S. Antitrust Laws to Pacific Countries:
ProposedBilateralAgreementsfor Resolving InternationalConflicts within the Pacific Community, 16 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 295 (1993); James G. Park, Extraterritorial
Impact of the UnitedStatis AntitrustLaws and CommercialBribery Considerations,1 Dicm.
J. INT'L L. 105 (1982); John H. Shenefield, Thoughts on ExtraterritorialApplication of the
United StatesAntitrust Laws, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 350 (1983); Eleanor M. Fox, Extraterritorality,Antitrus, and the New Restatement Is "Reasonableness"the Answer?, 19 N.Y.U.
I. INT'L L. & PoL. 565 (1987). Cf. Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876
(5th Cir. 1982); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
46. Courts consider the "degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality
or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal places of business of corporations,
the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the
relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with those elsewhere, the
extent to which there is [an] explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce, the
foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct abroad." T7imberlane,549 F.2d at
614. For a discussion of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act of 1982 (FTAIA)
and Antitrust Guidelines of the Justice Department, see Chang, supra note 45, at 306-08.
For an outstanding review of Justice Department policy, see Lori B. Morgan & Helaine S.
Rosenbaum, U.S. DepartmentofJusticeAntitrust Enforcement Policy,34 HARv. IN'rL L.J.
192 (1993).
47. See BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & PETROS C. MAvROIDS, Co.rPETION, CoMPTION POLICY, AM Tim GAIT, (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1228,
1993); ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAyr TiiE EVOLUTION OF
TRE MODERN GAIT LEGAL SYs.'w (1993). For a discussion of Japan's membership in
and adherence to the GAIT, see MATSUSHrTA & ScHOENBAuM, supra note 6, at 9-18;
MATsUsmTA, supra note 22; Michael W. Lochmann, The Japanese Voluntary Restrainton
Automobile Exports: An Abandonment of the Free Trade Principlesof the GA7T and the
Free Market Principles of United States Antitrust Laws, 27 HARV. INt'L L.. 99 (1986).
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prerequisite for resort to ESCs may range from political self-presentation or posturing to genuine concerns over trade inequities and antitrust violations. In focusing exclusively on the theoretical problems of
extraterritorial legal action, and the rise of defensive blocking statutes,
commentators have generally overlooked the wisdom of engaging in a
persistent course of extraterritorial threats and demands. In doing so,
commentators have neglected the most common of all extraterritorial
social controls, informal ESCs such as threats of trade sanctions and
concerted pressure to abide by the strictures of existing law. 8
2. Precedentfor the Effectiveness of ESCs
If the context and premise for ESCs may be found in the extraterritorial application of antitrust law, the precedent for ESC use may be
traced to the history of reactive reform in Japan following significant
external pressure from the United States and Europe. 49 Both Japanese and U.S. commentators have noted that foreign pressure
(gaiatsu) has been a proven catalyst for change of the status quo
(genjo iji) since the turn of the century.50 As a former MITI vice minister observed, nearly all of post-war Japan's liberalization policies
were implemented in response to foreign pressure. 1-' In the early
1960s, trade liberalization, and over the next the decade, capital liberalization, were undertaken reluctantly by industry and government
because of foreign pressure. U.S. pressure prompted financial and
communications liberalization in the 1980s.52 With such a history of
effectiveness, ESCs seem to be a logical, wise catalyst for regulatory
reform.
A favorable prognosis for the application of ESQs has been reinforced by the success of recent bilateral negotiations. Agreements between the U.S. and Japan to open markets in rice,
telecommunications, medical technology, flat glass, and insurance
have followed the Framework Agreement signed in July 1993. 53 Ja48. See John S. Magney, U.S. Extends Reach of Antitrust Enforcement, 11 INr'L FIN. L.
REv. 18 (1992) (arguing that the recent change in antitrust enforcement policy at the Department of Justice is unlikely to result in much litigation).
49. See, e.g., KENNETh B. PYLE, THE JAPANESE QUESTION: POWEnR AND PURPOSE IN

A NEW ERA 111-14 (1992).
50. Ryutaro Komiya & Motoshige, Japan'sInternationalTrade and Trade Policy, 19551984, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JAPAN 210 (T. Inoguchi & D.I. Okimoto eds., 1988).
51. Id. at 111-12.
52. See Hiroshi, supra note 24, at 56-59.
53. U.S. and Japan Announce Economic Framework Agreement, 4 U.S. DEPT. STATE
DISPATCH 29 (1993).
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pan's apparent willingness to undertake significant macroeconomic reforms raises expectations about the possibility of curing antitrust
practices.54 Any optimism concerning the utility of ESCs, however,
should be tempered by a consideration of four key variables that will
likely determine the effectiveness of any extraterritorial control initiative: (1) consistency of application, i.e., whether the ESCs will increase in formality with application (hierarchical application) or be
applied inconsistently over time (non-strategic application), (2) formality, i.e., the degree of formality, ranging from informal suggestions
for reform to formal initiations of legal action or economic sanctions,
(3) relational distance, i.e., the strength, intensity, and quality of the
relationship between both nation-states, and (4) receptivity of regulatory environment, i.e., the extent to which the ESCs can prompt meaningful regulatory change given the existing social controls imbedded in
the regulatory culture. Each of these variables will be discussed at
some length in the balance of this article, with an emphasis on the
receptivity of Japan's regulatory environment. 55
B. EscalatingESCs and Consensual Governance
Much like the idealized model of Braithwaite's pyramids, ESCs
may appear as a series of escalating warnings and threats. The U.S.
strategy with Japan has been simple minded: use extant law and law
enforcement in policing suspect industries and questionable trade
practices or face an escalation of extraterritorial controls. Unlike the
logic of enforcement and sanction pyramids, however, ESCs have not
been applied progressively and hierarchically.5 6 There is little consis54. See, eg., Dan F. Henderson, Access to the JapaneseMarket" Some Aspects of Foreign Exchange Controlsand Banking Law, in LAw Am TRADE IssuEs OF THE JAPAESn
ECONOMY, supra note 1, at 131.

55. In addition to these variables, the prognosis for lasting regulatory change appears
to turn on certain assumptions concerning the effect of social change on Japan. There are
two alternative hypotheses: (1) That the Japanese attach insubstantial importance to formal control and, thus, will not be affected by legalistic, rule-based initiatives, and (2) that
differences in the socio-cultural environment of Japan and the U.S. are decreasing, as the
former becomes increasingly Westernized, leaving open the possibility that formal controls
will be effective. See J. Mark Ramseyer, JapaneseAntitrust Enforcement After the Oil Em-

bargo, 31 AM. J. CoMp. L. 395, 426-28 (1983). As Ramseyer has noted, neither of these
hypotheses is entirely adequate. Fortunately, the arguments in this article do not require
either hypothesis. Rather, we focus on the prognosis for lasting regulatory reform following extraterritorial social controls. To maximize the effect of ESCs, we conclude that existing proactive and reactive constraints in Japan should be enhanced by extraterritorial
initiatives, rather than replaced by formal, rule-based controls.
56. It is not as if U.S. trade representatives have followed a logical and consistent
course of ESCs, moving from suggestions for reform to active pressure, demands for ac-
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tency in the application of ESCs due to: (1) the ease at which informal ESCs are applied by the United States, (2) the absence of any
standards or guidelines concerning the use and escalation of ESCs, (3)
the mercurial receptivity of Japan to antitrust reform, and (4) the
changes in U.S. trade policies toward Japan over the course of three
presidential administrations.
1.

Responses to ESCs

There is a certain irony in both the message and the messenger
with ESCs. The U.S. has used a coercive rule-based approach to
achieve greater reliance on law and formal controls in Japan's consensus-based regulatory environment. The message and messenger appear out of place in a country that is founded on informal conflict
resolution and mediation. This is not to suggest, however, that AG is
never supported by legal sanctions.5 7 This is also not to suggest that
Japan has failed to respond to ESCs. Over the last five years, a
number of ministries have adopted new and more stringent enforcement guidelines,58 raided trading firms suspected of bid rigging, 59 intion, and threats of legal and economic sanctions. A consistent and hierarchical progres-

sion of ESCs would appear much like Braithwaite's pyramid of sanctions.
Legal
Action
Threats
Demands
Pressure

Suggestions

Compliance is maximized, in the ideal, where there is an escalating program of pressure,
demands, and threats. See Anrs & BPtArrHwArrE, supra note 12, at 35-53.
57. See Young, supra note 20, at 923.
58. See, e.g., The Antimonopoly Act Guidelines Concerning Distribution Systems and
Business Practices,(Japan Fair 'rade Commission), July 11, 1991 (on file with authors).

For supportive commentary, see Japan Commission Strengthens Guidelines on Administrative Advice By Bureaucrats,Int'l Bus. & Fin. Daily (BNA), available iMLEXIS, News Library, BNAIBF File (July 7, 1994); JFTC Adopts Antimonopoly Act Guideline Governing

Competition and Venture Capital,67 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1679, at 290
(Sept. 1, 1994).
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creased the examination and enforcement staff,' strengthened the
JFTC's capacity to monitor the transactions among keiretsu firms, 61
re-examined the Japanese Company Law, 62 and imposed fines on
companies in an apparent response to ESCs.63
In fact, in direct response to strong pressure from the United
States several years ago, the JFrC filed the first criminal charges for
price fixing since the famous oil cartel cases twenty-two years ago.p4
The charges were described by JIFTC officials as a sign of a new and
more restrictive stance toward monopolistic practices. To both the naive and hopeful it appeared that AG would be supplemented by the
more frequent filing of criminal charges, reflecting a realization in Japan of a need for what has been termed "western style" or "rule-centered" legalism. 65 This need was apparently underscored by concerns
59. JFTC Raids Trading Companiesfor Bid Rigging,Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), Sept. 8,
1994.
60. JFTC Moves Into New Headquarters,Seeks Expanded Funding and Staffing, 67
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1679, at 289 (Sept. 1, 1994); Kantor Calls Japan
MarketReform Disappointin&Unlikely to Spur Talks, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at
488 (Mar. 30, 1994).
61. There are three pre-war zaibatsu related keiretsu (the big financial combines: Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo), three bank-related keiretsu (Fuji [Fuyo], Daiichikangyo,
and Sanwa), and the several independent corporate groups such as Toyota, Nissan, Matsushita, Toshiba, Shin Nihon Seitetsu, and Hitachi. The first six groups are called "horizontal
keiretsu" and the latter "vertical keiretsu." With the horizontal type, the presidents and
chairmen of the same group periodically exchange their opinions about general matters,
but they do not have common strategic decision-making meetings. The vertical groups, on
the other hand, are likely to hold a hierarchical structure among group corporations. See
the following two articles: Negishi Akira, Kigyo Keiretsu no Ho Kozo [LegalStructure of
IndustrialGroups], and Tsuji Yoshihiko, Seisan Keiretsu to Ho [Keiretsu in the Manufacturing Industry and Law], in KIGYo KEmEsu TO Ho [INDUSTRAL GROUPS AND LAw] 1-150
(Negishi Akira et al. eds., 1990); OKUmuRA HmosHm, SHi NinoN No RoiuDmt K G1yO
SHUDAN [THE Six LARGESr INDuSiAL GROUPS INJAPAN] (1983); G.NDA NInON NO
KIGYo GROUP [INusmiAL GROUPS IN MODEM JAPAN] (Sakamoto Kazuichi &
Shimotani Masahiro eds., 1987).
62. U.S.-JAPAN Womunr, GROUP ON SI, Second Annual Report of the U.S.-Japan
Working Group on the Structural Impediments Initiative (S11) 1136-H61 (July 30, 1992).
63. JapaneseCourt Metes out Finesto Firms Rigging Masked Seal Bids, 65 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1645, at 793 (Dec. 23, 1993).
64. Japan, in Rare Move, Charges Price-Fixingof Food Wrap, N.Y. Tsfis, Nov. 7,
1991, at D2. In the Oil Cartel Cases of 1973, twelve of the fourteen wholesale oil refining
corporations operating in Japan were charged with violating Article 3 of the Anti-Monopoly Law by fixing and controlling oil prices and production volume. Article 3 prohibits
unreasonable restraint of trade, such as any agreement to mutually restrict or conduct busi-

ness so as to fix, maintain, or enhance prices. See Haley, supra note 8.
65. See THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF JAPAN (Glenn D. Hook & Michael A. Weiner eds., 1992).
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in Japan about the appearance of legitimacy as their economy and
markets became increasingly open to foreign trade and investment.6
2. Resistance to ESCs
ESCs have done little to alter the government-industry allegiance
to AG, consensus driven regulation, and informal conflict resolution.
No matter how impressive the outcome of these initiatives appear, it is
only fair to conclude that ESCs have failed to prompt lasting regulatory reform. 67 This conclusion is shared by U.S. trade representatives
who routinely express their frustration with the slow progress of trade
reform.68 Many reasons have been offered for this failure. Professor
Ramseyer, for example, has argued that formal and informal antitrust
law enforcement have given way to domestic electoral politics. 69 The
ruling party, according to Ramseyer, offers lawful cartels through statutory exemptions to the antimonopoly laws in exchange for political
66. See Ramseyer, supra note 55, at 428-29.
67. Empirical evidence of this claim may be found in the criminal convictions under
the Antimonopoly Law. The first criminal penalty, and third conviction since the Oil Cartel Cases, was obtained on December 14, 1993. See Japanese Court Metes out Fines,supra
note 63, at 793. Further evidence of the failure of ESCs to effect significant change appears
in the numbers of investigations by the JFTC:
TOTAL NUMBER OF INVESTIGATIONS

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

226

194

180

270

254

241

227

91

78

62

85

101

74

91

135

116

118

185

153

167

136

CoNDucrs

148

132

95

169

180

150

173

ArONs TAKEN

129

118

87

153

164

141

131

DiscoN3N'uA.cns

19

14

8

16

16

9

42

CARRYING FOgWARD

78

62

85

101

74

91

54

BRINGING FORWARD
NEW INVE

GAnTONS

Kosei Torihiki Iinkai Nenji Hokoku Heisei3 Nendo [1991 Annual Report of The Japanese
FairTrade Commission: White Paperon Antimonopoly], The Japan Fair Trade Commission
16 (1991); Kosei Torihiki Iinkai Nenji Hokoku Heisei 5 Nendo [1993 Annual Report of the
Japanese Fair Trade Commission: White Paper of Antimonopoly], The Japan Fair Trade
Commission 17 (1993). Notably, on January 15, 1993, the Antimonopoly Law was revised
raising the maximum penalty from V5 million to V100 million. Heira Shijo Hihan wa
Osamaruka? [Will Criticism of Closed Market End?], NIHON KEIzAI SHINBUN, Dec. 27,
1992, at 17.
68. See e.g., Jonathan D. Richards, JapanFair Trade Commission Guidelines Concerning DistributionSystems and Business Practices: An Illustrationof Why Antitrust Law Is a
Weak Solution to U.S. Trade Problems with Japan, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 921.
69. J. Mark Ramseyer, The Antitrust Pork Barrel in Japan, ANTrr.usT, Summer 1992,
at 40.
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contributions. 70 A more frequent explanation is that the problems of
trade more generally, and of antitrust law enforcement in particular,
stem from distinct differences in Japanese and U.S. legal culture?'
Consistent with this cultural explanation, we suggest that the U.S.
has attempted, under the guise of ESCs, to export a rule-based vision
of regulatory compliance and enforcement that underestimates the
role of consensus and mediation in Japanese administrative regulation. 2 In doing so, the U.S. has far over-estimated its ability to implement, through inconsistent extraterritorial efforts, lasting regulatory
reform.73 In the next part, we will suggest that this over-estimation
stems from a misconception of the complex system of institutional social controls (described in the next part as concentric circles), as well
as social cognitions that serve as a foundation for administrative guidance and consensual regulation. Our contribution to the ongoing debate over extraterritorial initiatives is the conclusion that Japan's
socio-cultural tradition is underwritten by strong informal social controls that, with extraterritorial support, will effectively ensure regulatory compliance without the introduction of a western style antitrust
enforcement agenda.74
As will become increasingly clear, the regulation of trade and
commerce in Japan is inextricably connected to the socio-cultural environment and existing social controls. 5 The same may be said of the
reliance on informal mediation and consensus building rather than
formal rule-based regulation. The design of U.S. trade policy should
70. Cf. Harry First, Response" Selling Antitrust in Japan,ANTrrRusT, Spring 1992, at
34.

71. See Haley, Luck, Law, Culture, and Trade, supra note 8, at 404 ("Behind both the
monthly trade figures and the public quarrel lie profound differences in the two societies,

institutional and cultural environments, which influence both economic and political behavior. Pivotal are the differences in the shared values, attitudes and expectations toward

law and the state-in other words, their legal cultures-that shape and concomitantly are
shaped by the institutional arrangements for social ordering.") See also CHmA, supra note
8.
72. It is not surprising that the nature and character of the Japanese regulatory environment may have been misjudged. Japanese culture and social structure are still the objects of academic debate by Western scholars, policy makers, and government officials. See
Robert J. Smith, Culture as Explanation: Neither All Nor Nothing, 22 CoRNE.L INe'L LI.

425 (1989). As noted earlier, however, it is surprising that U.S. trade policy promotes the
exportation of formal social controls to a society that has relied almost entirely on third
party mediation, consensus-driven policy, and informal social controls.
73. Cf. First,supra note 70, at 34.

74. See infra Part V.A.
75. See Asp~crs OF SocLL CHANGE IN MODERN JAPAN (Ronald P. Dore ed., 1967);
KAzUKo TsuuIM, SOCLAL CHANGE AND THE INDvmuAL (1970).
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consider the strong normative influence found in Japan's socio-cultural environment. 76
III. THE NORMATIVE INFLUENCE OF
CONCENTRIC CIRCLES
Consistent with Confucian theology, individuals and organizations in Japan tend to conceive of their social environment as having a
centrifugal order, characteristic of a water ring. 77 Commentators have
called this symbolic pattern a framework of concentric circles. 78 Individuals, groups, and organizations function in the realm of the following four concentric circles: family, fellow, Japan, and the world.7 9
Each circle has its ethics, customs, norms, and codes of conduct. We
will argue that concentric circles are the single most significant loci of
normative constraint or social control in Japan. 0
Concentric circles exert proactive and reactive control over individual and corporate agents.8 1 Proactive social control is found in the
circle's collective commitment to long term reciprocity; the effort to
balance and counterbalance debts and benefits; the exchange of gifts,
information, and services within a circle; the practice of cross-shareholding; the reciprocal trading networks that typify the horizontal
keiretsu; the symbiotic relations between and among businesses, polit76. See Haley, JapaneseAntitrust Enforcement, supra note 8, at 335.

77. Many commentators consider Confucianism to be the most influential value system in Japan. Abegglen and Stalk, for example, have noted that: "The Confucian ethic,
with its emphasis on respect for rank and age, has provided much of the value system" to
Japanese corporations. JAMES C. ABEGGLEN & GEORGE STALK, JR., KAISHA, TH JAPA.
NESE CORPORATION 198 (1985). Others have also credited Confucianism with the economic development of the western Pacific Rim. See Micnio MORsI-nMA, WHY HAS
JAPAN 'SUCCEEDED'?: WESrERN TECHNOLOGY AND THE JAPANESE ETHOS (1982); Il-Gon
Kim, Application of Confucian Ethics to Moden Economy: A Way to Give Life to the

Cultural of Family Groupism, in GLOBALIZATION AND THE ETHICS OF ECONOMY 169
(1990). See also Iwao Taka, BusinessEthics: A JapaneseView, in BusIN1sS ETHICS: JAPAN
AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (Thomas W. Dunfee & Yukimasa Nagayasu eds., 1993).
78. Doi TAKEo, AMAE NO Kozo [STRucruRE OF "AMAE" ("PSYCHOLOGICAL DE-

(1971); KYOGOKU
(1983).
79. See Taka, supra note 77.
PENDENCE")]

JUNICHI, NIHON NO SEUI

[POLITICS OF JAPAN]

191-94

80. This argument leads to the conclusion in the second part that, to the extent that
the U.S. engages in extraterritorial initiatives, these efforts should have the effect of
strengthening corporate self-regulation, as well as AG. Given the potency of informal social controls in Japan, fostering self-regulation and administrative oversight is the preferred
initiative for lasting regulatory reform.
81. Cf.NAKANE CHIE, TATE SHAKA NO NINGEN KANKEI [HUMAN RELATIONS OF
VERTICAL SoCIET] 1 (1967) (discussing the normative effects of "frames").
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ical communities, and governmental agencies; and the inhibiting effect
of reputational damage or threat of damage. 2
These commitments, efforts, practices, and relations exert proactive social control in at least three directions.83 First, inner circles are
the objects of significant normative influence from those within the
circles. Reciprocal dealings and the promotion of what Professor
Nakane has called a "total group consciousness" ensure normative order within one's circle .' In addition, the social distance between and
among members of the same concentric circle is minimized so as to
enhance group allegiance, loyalty, and solidarity. Second, outside circles exert significant influence on inside circles. The fellow circle, for
example, is constrained by its interactions with the Japan and world
circles. Third, when a new configuration within a circle is established,
membership immediately begins to discourage circle constituents from
engaging in norm-violative action. In short, the proactive normative
influence of concentric circles extends bi-directionally across circles
and across members.85
82. See infra notes 178 to 179 and accompanying text.
83. See NAKAE, supra note 81, at 9-11. Nakane discusses the need to strengthen
group ties and bonds to make the "group element tougher." This may be accomplished in
two ways: "One is to influence the members within the frame in such a way that they have
a feeling of 'one-ness'; the second method is to create an internal organization which will

tie the individuals in the group to each other and then to strengthen this organization." Id.
at 9.
84. Id. at 10.
85.

Concentric Circles

Social Control
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Reactive social control, derived from models of conciliatory con86
trol, responds to deviance that has emerged within concentric circles.
When normative violations occur, a reactive social control from within
and outside circle membership prompts mediation, conciliation, acceptance of responsibility, conflict resolution, and pressure to inhibit
further offenses. Reactive social controls are inextricably tied to social hierarchies found in concentric circles. 87
In the next several sections, we will consider the ingredients and
effects of concentric circles in some detail, beginning with the cognitive norms of the individual agent.88
A.

Cognitive Norms
1. Individual as Cognitive Agent

The family circle reflects the primacy of family relationships and
household structure (ie and uchi). 9 Central to the notion of the family circle is the relationship between parent and child.93 This axial relationship is characterized by maternal benevolence as well as strong
feelings of dependence by children on their parents. 91 The most important of all virtues in the family circle is filial piety. 92 The significance of piety reflects an overriding sense of obligation, indebtedness,
and gratitude to parents. 93 With this sense of filial piety comes an
86. For an excellent discussion of conciliatory social control, see HoRwrrz, supra note
33, at 65 ("The parties involved in conciliatory control work together or with the aid of
third parties to negotiate a mutually agreeable outcome. Solutions ara obtained through
mutual bargaining between the parties involved, not coerced through imposed sanctions.").

87. See infra Part Ill.C.
88. For a summary of the effects of social control, see Table 3 on page 525.
89. See NAKANE, supra note 81, at 5 ("[H]uman relationships within this household
group are thought of as more important than all other human relationships."); see also Joy
21-37 (1987); RICHARD K. BEARDSLEY ET
At.., VILLAGE JAPAN (1959). For an excellent review of the effects of the household system
HENDRY, UNDERSTANDING JAPANESE SOCIETY

see Kawamura Nozomu, The Transitionofthe Household System in Japan'sModernization,
ifl CONSTRUCTS FOR UNDERSTANDING JAPAN 202-27 (Yoshio Sugimoto & Ross E. Mourer
eds., 1989); MuRAKAMI YAsusuKE ET AL., BUNME TOSHrrE NO IE SHAKAI [THE IE Soci.

(1979).
90. The relationship between a mother and her child is central in this circle. The
mother accepts practically all of her child's behavior, while the child is entirely dependent.
91. See EDWIN 0. REISCHAUER, THE JAPANESE TODAY: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY
ETY AS CIVILIZATION]

(1988); TAASXsm FUKUTAKE, THE JAPANESE SOCIAL STRUCTURE: ITS EVALUATION IN
THE MODERN CENTURY (Ronald P. Dore ed., 1981).
92. Cf MrrsuYu MASATSUGU, THm MODERN SAMURi SOCmTY: DUTY AND DE.
PENDENCE IN CoNTEmPORARY JAPAN (1982).
93. See GEORGE A. DEVos, SOCIALIZATION FOR AcHimvEMENm- ESSAYS ON THE
CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE JAPANESE (1973).
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unquestioning deference to the decisions of the head of the family. 94
To ensure and preserve harmonious unity, familial conflict is resolved
by the designated head of the family.95
The fellow circle includes friends, colleagues, and distant relatives. It is also composed of superiors as well as colleagues from the
workplace. In this circle, material and spiritual "credits" and "debits"
are balanced. 96 If a person provides a benefit for members of this
circle, other circle members will owe a debt that should be repaid as a
favor.97 Upon receipt of a favor, a person will also inherit a debt that
must be repaid in time.98 The focus is on long-term exchange and reciprocity. 99 Unlike the family circle, the fellow circle encourages an
equilibrium in favors owed and received. When there is a large imbalance in favors owed, a person will feel shame and face criticism.lC3
The Japan circle is characterized as a "wide society." Social differences and status distinctions are often reinforced here. Feeling estranged from those who are neither acquaintances nor peers, the
importance of self-presentation is minimized. Even so, most Japanese
feel a strong sense of identity or affinity with their group and therefore avoid actions that damage the group's reputation. 101 Although
members of this circle are strangers, a common cultural background
ensures an appreciation of and commitment to the notion of longterm reciprocity. In this respect, this circle differs from the world
circle.
94. I, at 28-29.

95. See Doi, supra note 78, at 38-43; NAKANE, supra note 81, at 13 ("In the ideal
traditional household in Japan, for example, opinions of the members of the household
should always be held unanimously regardless of the issue, and this normally meant that all
members accepted the opinion of the household head, without even discussing the issue.").

96. FuKuTAKE, supra note 91, at 25.
97. For a fascinating extension of the culture of reciprocity in Japan, see Harumi Befu,
A Theory of Social Exchange as Applied to Japan, in CoNsTRuCTS FOR UtNDERSrTANDNG

JAPAN 39-66 (Yoshio Sugimoto & Ross E. Mouer eds., 1989) (discussing exchange transactions between and among individuals, entities without physical existence, corporate bodies,

and society). For a general treatment of reciprocity, see Alvin V.Gouldner, The Norm of
Reciprocity, 25 Am. Soc. REv. 161 (1960).

98. The norm of reciprocity reflects a general ethical principle that is supported by
"customary rules of exchange" and "strategies of exchange." These rules guide what is
considered appropriate and strategic reciprocation. See Befu, supra note 97, at 43.
99. See ROBERT J. SMITH, JAPANEsE SoCIEmr. TRADITiON, SELIF AND THE SOCIAL
ORDER (1983).
100. See Rutm BENEDIcr, THE CHRYSAntEM tUM AND Tnm SwoRD: PATrrENs OF
JAPANEsE CuLTURE (1946).
101. See SMITH, supra note 99.
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An international society surrounds the three concentric circles.
This circle represents the world. Most Japanese consider the world
circle to be turbulent (ukiyo) and a threat to the integrity of the inner
circles."° Those who are averse to risk tend to shield the inner circles
from the world. The world circle is welcomed, however, by those who
place a great value on opportunity and advancement.10 3
2. Corporationas Cognitive Agent
Aggregates of individuals, such as corporations, also tend to interpret their social environment in terms of concentric circles. The
complex socio-cultural environment of a corporation or business organization may be classified into the four concentric: circles: quasifamily, fellow, Japan, and the world. A corporation has a quasi-family
circle that typically consists of business partners (e.g., parent, sister, or
affiliated companies.)" In this circle, traditional familial relations
foster employee relations and corporate alliances that often resemble
the social bonds found in a parent-child relationship.'(" Mutual trust
and shared expectations characterize these long-term business relationships. °6 In the fellow circle, a corporation interacts with its
banks, fellow traders, affiliated firms, employees, and long-term customers. 0 7 Relations between assemblers and their suppliers within
vertical keiretsu'08 are found within this circle.109 In the case of horizontal keiretsu"0 (e.g., the Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Dai Ichi
Kangyo, Fuyo, and Sanwa groups), the core member corporations also
102. See FumxuAKE, supra note 91, at 49.
103. See NAANE,supra note 81.

104. Core companies of "vertical keiretsu" like the Toyota, Hitachi, or Matsushita
groups are excellent examples of the quasi-family circle. See Nozomu, supra note 89.
105. See NIHON No KiGYo [JAPANEs E CORPoRATIoNs] 131-58 (Imai Kenichi & Komiya
Ryutaro eds. 1989); W. Mark Fruin, The Firm As a Family and the Family As a Firm In
Japan, 5 J. FAM. HIsT. 1 (1980). See also FuKuTAKE, supra note 91, at 147. Nakane has
noted that "[tlhough it is often said that the traditional family institution (ie) has disappeared, the concept of the ie still persists in modem contexts. A company is conceived as
an ie, all its employees qualifying as members of the household, with the employer at its
head. Again this 'family' envelops the employee's personal family; it 'engages' him 'totally'

(marugakae in Japanese)." NAXANE, supra note 81, at 7-8.
106. W. CARL KESR, JAPANEsE TAxEovERs: THE GLOBAL COIrST'FOR CORPO-

RATE CONTROL 62-67 (1991).
107. See W. MARK FRUrN, THE JAPANESE ENTERPRISE SYSTEM: CoMPETTvVE STRAT-r.
GIES AND CORPORATE STmucroRms (1992).

108. See supra note 61.
109. Michael Gerlach, Business Alliances and the Strategy of the JapaneseFirm, 30 CAL.
MGrr. REv. 162 (1987).
110. See supra note 61.
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belong to this fellow circle.' When members of a corporation belong
to outside associations like Nihon JidoshaKogyou Kai (Japanese Auto
Manufacturers Association), Keidanren (Japanese Federation of Economic Organizations)," or Keizai Doyukai (Japanese Association of
Corporate Executives), these associations are included in the fellow
circle as well. It is not unusual for the government to be part of the
fellow circle of a powerful, well-positioned corporation. As with individuals, the fellow circle of a corporation is characterized by a commitment to long-term reciprocal dealings. If the corporation does not
offer benefits that are sufficient to counterbalance debts, then it risks
damaging its business relations. If the corporation, however, can successfully balance benefits and debts, or maintain a surplus of favors, it
will receive preferential treatment by other agents in the fellow circle.
The Japan circle is characterized by the principle of free competition. Competitors, unrelated corporations, individual stockholders,
and consumers are found in this circle. Even with free competition
and increasing alienation among "unrelated" or "unaffiliated" corporations it is still relatively rare for corporations in the Japan circle to
engage in unethical or illegal acts.'13 Member corporations in the
same quasi-family and fellow circles most often exert effective social
control.
The world circle, in contrast, is far less controlled. This circle is a
forum where relations among corporations become increasingly attenuated. Corporations are less concerned about self-presentation, reputation, and reciprocity. Corporations in this circle resort to the legal
system when and where significant business conflicts arise that cannot
111. For instance, consider the interrelations among the companies in the big six horizontal keiretsu. There ate between 44 (Fuyo) and 20 (Sumitomo) subsidiaries and affili-

ated corporations including banking, insurance, construction, textile, chemical, steel,
electric, shipbuilding, automotive, and shipping partners. See Maruyama Yoshinari, The

Big Six HorizontalKeiretsu, 28 JAPAN Q. 186 (1992). In addition to these affiliated companies, each keiretsu has established an executive club designed to foster and promote group

solidarity. Beyond this role, executive clubs mediate conflicts between group member
companies and provide a forum for the adjudication of controversies. See Ely Razin, Are
the Keiretsu Anticompetitive? Look to the Law, 18 N.C. J. INTL L. & Cot.REG. 351
(1993).
112. The Keidanren was established in 1946. As of December 1990, it was composed of
121 association and 939 corporate members. The main purpose of Keldanren is to find
practical solutions to economic problems and to contribute to the sound development of

the economies of Japan and of the world. The present Chairman of Keldanren is Gaishi
Hiraiwa (Chairman of The Tokyo Electric Power). See, ag., FimancialKelretsu Strengthen
Solidarity,ToKYo Bus. TODAY, Feb. 1991, at 26.

113. See William S. Laufer & Alison Cohen, CorporateCrime and CorporateSanctions
in Japan, 12 Bus. CoNTrEmp. WoRLD 123 (1992).
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be informally resolved. As with individuals, the world circle is also
viewed as turbulent and, at times, chaotic. This, it has been argued,
prompts contradictions in corporate attitudes and behavior. For example, corporations hope to exclude foreign business corporations
that do not share a commitment to long-term reciprocity. But this is
far from easy to accomplish, given the significant interest in and de114
mand for foreign technologies, products, and services.
In summary, the normative environment of concentric circles exerts significant influence on both individual and corporate actors. As
Table 2 suggests, the quality of this normative constr'aint or control
often diminishes as relationships among the circle constituents become increasingly distant and abstract.
Table 2
LEVEL OF
CmCLE
htDVIDUAL

CORPORATION

Family
Fellow
IJapan
World
Quasi-Family
Fellow
Japan

SOCIAL CONmoL

Strong feelings of dependency and indebtedness to
parents; filial piety; resolution of conflict by designated
head of family: subordination of interests
Long-term reciprocity; balancing of debts and credits
Sense of identity with common cultural background
Parent company asserts control over subsidiaries;
responsibility of parent company for actions of
subsidiaries
Long-term reciprocity balancing of debts and credits
Principle of free competition

World

In addition to revealing the influence of cognitive norms, the
framework of concentric circles also provides a context for the
normative effect of two critically important business-related practices:
114. When Sony or Kyocera, for example, faced difficulties entering the Japanese market, they tried to succeed in the American and international market;. Once successful,
they were immediately held in high regard by large Japanese companies. This demonstrates Japanese corporate attitudes towards success. Iwao Taka, Sengo Nihon no Kigyoka
Seishin (Ue) [The Spiritof JapaneseEntrepreneurshipAfter World War U1 (1)], 42 RnrrAxu
U. J. 185-213 (1986); Iwao Taka, Sengo Nihon no Kigyoka Seishin (Shita) [The Spirit of
Japanese EntrepreneurshipAfter World War 11 (2)], 43 RnrrAxu U. . 205-33 (1986).
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reciprocal relations in the business community and the "triumvirate"
of the political community. 1 5 The former includes keiretsu and the
practice of cross-shareholding. The latter considers AG and the more
significant triangular relationship among business leaders, politicians,
and bureaucrats.
B. Reciprocal Business Relations
Japanese corporations, regardless of size, hope to develop close
long-term relations in the fellow circle through the active exchange of
favors. 116 The logic for exchanging favors is grounded in the widely
held belief that business opportunities will undoubtedly increase once
long-term reciprocal relationships have been established." 7 Many
business practices in Japan recognize the desirability of inclusion
within the fellow circle. Examples include giving gifts, offering entertainment, relaxing policies concerning the return of goods, 18 sending staff or directors to a related company, and engaging in crossshareholding.
Corporations maintain relations by giving gifts semi-annually to
executives, managers, or employees of related companies. 1 9 Gifts
are not intended as bribes but rather as an expression of hope that the
donor will maintain its status in the fellow circle.120 Frequently, corporations foster business relationships by offering executives, managers, and employees of related companies entertainment on special
occasions. Although the ethics of this custom have been questioned in
some cultures, the Japanese business community considers it to be an
important form of marketing.'" In many industries, such as cosmetics,
pharmaceuticals, and publications, retailers are allowed to return un115. AB3E Hrrosm Er At., GENDAI NIHON NO SEW [PoLMCS OF MODERN JAPAN] 98
(1990).
116. See KESTER, supra note 106.
117. See Befu, supra note 97.

118. Yoshiro Miwa explained that this practice is not only fair but also rational when
the following conditions are met: (1) the size of retailers is small, (2) the number of suppliers is large, (3) the amount of products supplied is large, (4) when displaying products,
retailers can encourage consumers to buy them, and (5) when the marginal cost of manu-

facturing a product is far cheaper than the sales price of the product. For example, a product (or distribution system) that meets these conditions is cosmetics (or keiretsu of
cosmetics distribution). See NIHON No RYUTSU [THE JAPANESE DLsTRmun.ioN Sirsmt ]
19-24 (Miwa Yoshiro & Nishimura Kiyohiko eds., 1991); MiwA YosHmo, NiNON NO
ToRnmia KANKo [JAPA ESE BusINEss PRAcricns] 32-41 (1991).
119. See MrwA, supra note 118, at 32.
120. Id.
121. See, eg., WmLLAm H. SHAw, BusuNmSS EmIcs 268-69 (1991).
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sold products to wholesalers or producers. If the wholesalers or producers refuse to accept residuals, the retailers will leave the fellow
circle. Producers view their relationship with retailers as critical-so
122
much so that they are often willing to incur losses on unsold goods.
Among all fellow circle business practices, cross-shareholding is
one of the most important. 123 Once a company accepts a "related"
corporation as a business partner, it is often given corporate shares.
Holding the shares of a related corporation promotes a business consortium. This practice is found not only in vertical and horizontal
keiretsu, but also in small and medium-sized firms throughout Japan.124 Attempts by outsiders to adversely affect cross-shareholding
relationships are most often thwarted by consortium-member corporations. 25 Interestingly, a recent JFTC survey shows that between
1981 and 1988 the ratio26of cross-shareholding declined from 25.48 percent to 21.61 percent.'
C. Triangular Relations
Administrative guidance is perhaps the single most significant institutional practice in the political community. 2 7 AG has been supported by the "triangular" relations or triumvirate among top business
leaders, politicians, and elite bureaucrats. 128 As we shall see below, its
122. See Tetsu Kobayashi, The Effect of the Practiceof Returned Unsold Goods in Japan
on Entry into the JapaneseMarket,4 OSAKA Crry U. Bus. REv. 23 (1993) (noting that the
JFTC does not regard the return of goods as violative of the Antimonopoly Act [AMA]).
123. See Paul Sheard, Interlocking Shareholdings and Corporate Governance, In THE
JAPANESE FiRM: SOURCES OF COMPETITIVE STRENGTH (Masahiko Aoki & Ronald Dore
eds., 1994). Cross-shareholding has been called the "glue that binds horizontal kelretsu."
Yoshinari, supra note 111, at 198.
124. See Michael Gerlach, Keiretsu Organization in the Japanese Economy: Analysis
and Trade Implications, in PoLrrxcs AND PRODuCrIvrTY: How JAPAN'S DEVELOPMENT
STRATEGY WORKS 141 (Chalmers Johnson et al. eds., 1989); AnEGOLEN & STALK, supra
note 77.
125. See KESTER, supra note 106, at 258-59.

126. THE JAPAN FAIR TRADE COMMISSION, KIGYOKAN ToRiHKI NO JITAI NI KAN
SURU CHOSA [RESEARCH ON CORPORATE TRANSAcrnONS] 15 (1991).
127. See Takashi Wakiyama, The Nature and Tools of Japan's Industrial Policy, 27
HARV. INT'L LJ. 467 (1986).
128. The traditional triumvirate has changed following the recent elections. New political parties have developed powerful constituencies (e.g., New Frontier Party), and established parties (the Liberal Democratic Party [LDP] and Socialist Party) have joined
together to form the present cabinet. Japan is in the process of reshaping its political structure. This movement already has affected the traditional triumvirate. It will probably give
birth to a new triumvirate that will ensure the continued commitment to long-term
reciprocity.
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structure has been clearly supported by the normative constraint of
concentric circles.
1.

Triumvirate

To fully appreciate the importance of the triumvirate, it is necessary to recognize the symbiotic relations among business, politicians,
and government. Consider, for example, that influential business organizations often include the Japanese bureaucracy (e.g., MIT[ and
the Ministry of Finance) and politicians-mainly Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP) members-in its fellow circle.12 9 Additionally, business
leaders routinely contribute large sums to campaign funds to procure
a balance of favors. 30 Corporations have provided donations to the
most powerful political party, formerly the LDP, through economic
federations (e.g., Keidanren,Nikkeiren, Nissho, Doyukai, etc.) and in-

dustrial organizations (e.g., Japanese Automobile Association, Life Insurance Association, Japanese Construction Industry Federation, and

Petroleum Association). Corporations also purchase the party tickets.131 Along with such donations, business leaders often endorse politicians by publicly declaring their support.

32

129. For example, Mitsubishi bank not only has 28 Mitsubishi group companies (Friday
Meeting members) such as Mitsubishi Trust Bank, Meiji Insurance, Mitsubishi Heavy Industry, Mitsubishi Motor, and Mitsubishi Trading, but also has so-called zoku politicians
who are familiar with the banking business as well as the Banking Bureau of the Ministry
of Finance.
130. See Sone Yashunori, Interest Groups and the Processof PoliticalDecision-Making
in Japan, in CONSTRUCTS tOR UNDERsArmiNG JAPAN 259-95 (Yoshio Sugimoto & Ross
E. Mouer eds., 1989).
131. The Japanese Political Donation Law set a limit on the amount that each political
organization could receive. In response, politicians increased the number of such organizations and began to sell more of their "party tickets" to raise money.
132. In 1986, the LDP received about W.8 billion (70% of total donations) from corporations and industrial organizations. TSUJINAKA YuTrAXA, RmE SHtDAN [lrERES_
GRouP] 129-32 (3d ed. 1991). The revenues (in millions of yen) of each faction of the LDP
in 1990 and 1991 were as follows:
NAmE OF FArob

1990

1991

893

810

2.579

1,463

Miyazawa

983

1268

Watanabe

1.728

1,878

Komoto

1,502

784

380

290

Takeshita
Mitsuzuka (Abe)

Kato

Although the Takeshita faction's revenue decreased in 1991, the reserve carried forward
reached over 2 billion yen. This reserve was much larger than any other LDP faction. Selil
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Relations with bureaucrats add additional strength to the triumvirate. Private corporations, for example, offer jobs to bureaucrats
upon retirement. Many retired bureaucrats accept positions in the
firms that they once supervised, a practice known as amakudari, or
"descending from heaven." 133 Relations are kept close through disclosure requirements. Corporate officials are often asked to voluntarily disclose information regarding their company lo a bureau or
ministry. Prompt and honest disclosures foster a spirit of cooperation
and reciprocity. 134 Most significantly, governmental ministries, bureaus, and departments depend on the survival and development of
the industries that they regulate.1 35 A truly reciprocal relationship develops with ministries acting on behalf of the industry in return for the
industry's allegiance and guidance. Over time, each action or inaction
is noted, balanced, and counterbalanced.
Politicians have their own fellow circle that includes both business
leaders and bureaucrats. They attend to requests from corporations
and industries. In the past, politicians have revised laws that adversely
affected corporate interests, suggested names of business leaders to
bureaucrats to become members of a shingikai (deliberative council),
encouraged administrative agencies to give approval to start or expand businesses, and facilitated administrative procedures. Relations
between politicians and bureaucrats are also reciprocal. Even though
politicians possess formal authority, they tend to enact statutes and
1 36
Polipass bills drafted by the bureaucrats with little or no revision.
ticians are known to promote elite bureaucrats to administrative
posts, and retired bureaucrats frequently become politicians.
The bureaucracy has a fellow circle that in many ways resembles
the relations found between business leaders and politicians. Included
in the circle are both the politicians and leaders of business corporations. The bureaucracy responds to requests by politicians to reconShikin, Saiko no 1857 Oku Yen [PoliticalFund Reaches the Highest 185.7 Billion Yen],
NIHON KEIZAI SHmNBuN, Sept. 11, 1992, at 1. On December 18, 1992, the Takeshita faction

was separated into two factions: the Obuchi group (Takeshita faction) and the Hada/
Ozawa faction. 'HadalOzawa Ha' kyo Hossoku ['Hada/Ozawa Faction' Inaugurated Today], NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN, Dec. 18, 1992, at 2.

133. 15% of the foreign corporations and foreign interest groups in Japan send their
members to shingikai (deliberative council) (68% in the case of the Japanese). Approximately 30% of them have accepted amakudari (19% in the case of the Japanese). See
TsuINAKA, supra note 132, at 196-97.
134. KYOGOKU, supra note 78, at 70-71.
135. TSUJINAKA, supra note 132, at 143-44.
136. From the 1st Diet (1947) to the 112th Diet (1988), 68% of all the proposed bills
were introduced by the Cabinet (bureaucrats). ABE Er AL., supra note 115, at 20-23.
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sider administrative decisions that are adverse to their constituents'
interests. Often, bureaucrats will be asked to facilitate administrative
procedures that would benefit constituents who have previously provided campaign support. For example, bureaucrats are likely to satisfy requests from politicians to issue certifications, registrations, or
permissions to private companies. Even if the bureaucrats have already denied a prior corporate request, influential politicians may
have that request reviewed again and granted to protect their honor.
There is a significant interest in maintaining a balance between favors
and debts.
Ministries such as MITI have used their authority to foster industrial growth in order to provide assistance to business leaders. 137 In
the 1950s, MITI protected strategic industries by regulating the influx
of foreign capital and setting non-tariff barriers such as import restrictions.' 38 In 1953, the Antimonopoly Act (AMA) was revised, allowing a temporary cartel designed to streamline industries and
counter an economic recession. This revision of the AMA was made
after a formal request by Keidanren and in139
response to public opinion
favoring a reconstruction of the economy.
In the 1960s, facing the age of capital liberalization (1967-73),
MITI tried to restructure the steel, automobile, machine, and electronics industries to ensure their international competitiveness. During this decade, many large-scale mergers (e.g., three Mitsubishi
corporations, Nissan and Prince Motors, and Yawata and Fuji Steels)
were allowed. 14 0 In the late 1960s, in response to the expectations of

industrial leaders, MITT supported computer research and development. Governmental priority gradually shifted from heavy industries
137. This is not to suggest that MITI's intervention has brought consistent success to
the Japanese industries. On the contrary, as Tsuruta has noted, MITI has made many strategic errors in industrial policies. See TSURUTA TOSHIMASA, SENGO NuiON
vO SANGYO
SEIsAKU [INDusmrAL Potuems oF PosT-WAR JAPAN] 191-98 (1982). A recent example is

the "fifth-generation computer project." After spending more than $400 million, the Japanese government decided to give away the software developed by the project.
138. The Japanese Antimonopoly Act (AMA) was enacted in 1947. Because of the
support of the Allied Occupation Force, from 1947 to 1952, the Law was rigorously enforced against Japanese corporations. In 1953, however, the Law was revised to favor corporations. Mitsuo Matsushita, The Antimonopoly Law of Japan, 11 L. JA.,N 57 (1978).
139. See, eg., TSURuTA, supranote 137, at 32-50,58-81. The amendment resulted in the
elimination of the provision that regarded cartels as illegal In its place, other provisions
were introduced that allowed for exemptions and resale price maintenance. See Matsushita, supra note 138, at 57.
140. TsuttrrA, supra note 137, at 82-96, 115-30. Matsushita, supra note 138.
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to high-technology industries. 1 In the 1970s, many industries formed
"recession cartels," due in part to the first oil crisis of 1973, that were
largely supported by MITI. In addition, the legislature enacted the
Structurally Depressed Industries Law to rescue declning industries
by encouraging corporations to dismantle unprofitable facilities.142
Although the role of the bureaucracy has changed, especially in the
1980s and early 1990s, 143 its main function has been to foster growth
of Japanese industries through preferential treatment (e.g., tax reduction, subsidy, and deregulation), and to reduce friction among special
interest groups. 144 Unlike most other regulatory environments, bureaucrats in Japan allow, and often encourage, the private sector to
participate in the external policy-making process so that a consensus
145 The bucan be reached among stakeholders and interest groups.
46
reaucracy exists for the benefit of Japanese industries.
D. Dynamics of Concentric Circles
As noted earlier, concentric circles serve at least two social-control functions: proactive and reactive. Proactive control provides insulation against normative deviation. Reactive control responds to
141. See Shinjo, K., Computer Sangyo [Computer Industry] in NIHON No SANOYO
SEISAKU [IruSRIAL POLICY INJAPAN] 305-16 (Ryutaro Komiya et al. eds., 1984).
142. TSURUTA, supra note 137, at 224-25, 251-58.
143. In the late 1980s, the government first opened research and development opportunities to foreign corporations. For example, MITI approved Du Pont'l; request to participate in one of MITI's projects. This project, in which 46 Japanese corporations have
participated (such as NEC, Hitachi, and Sumitomo Electronic Industries), is designing
next-generation superconducting materials. Chodendo Center no Ke,:kyu Kalhatsu, DuPont Sanka e [R&D of the Superconducting Center: DuPont Will Participate],NIHON
KEIZAi S-mNBuN, Oct. 5, 1992, at 1.

144. See, e.g., IsuzuiHonda Teikei no Shogeki [Shock of Isuzu-Honda Coalition],NIHON
KEIZAx SHImuN, Dec. 21, 1992, at 11. The European and Japanese automobile markets

differ significantly. British Leyland has about 40% of the British market share, Renault
and Peugeot control almost all of the French market, and Fiat has approximately 80% of
the Italian market. The same goes for steel, computers, and petrochemicals. HIWATAi
NOBUHIRO, SENGO NIHON NO SHUO TO SE1 [MARKET AND POLrIcs OF POSTWAR JAPAN], 14-19 (1991).
145. See Yashunori, supra note 130, at 259-95.

146. The integrity of triangular relations is put to the test with diverse corporate, bureaucratic, and political interests. The Japanese political community, for example, may be
found not only in the common area of the three fellow circles but also in a variety of other
interest groups. The functional division of ministries according to industry also has the
unfortunate consequence of creating conflict among ministries, agencies, and bureaus. The
triangular relationship is further constrained by both the Japan circle and world circle.
Finally, the triangular structure has faced a new challenge: The formation of research and
advisory councils, such as the shingikai, the chosakai (research council), and the shiteki
shimon kikan (private advisory body of the Prime Minister or Ministers).
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deviance that has surfaced. In Japan, the framework of concentric circles generally serves a proactive function. The formal and informal
social hierarchies, discussed below, most often provide a reactive control.1 47 How do concentric circles exert social control over agents?
The framework influences agents in two ways: by encouraging them
to abide by normative rules and customs, and by deterring them from
engaging in normative deviance. Deterrence is closely related to the
proactive function of social control-a function that may be seen in
Professor Kyogoku's notion of an "operation base and battlefield."'14
1.

ProactiveFunction-OperationBase and Battlefield

Each concentric circle has elements of a battlefield and operation
base. Individuals and corporations are likely to regard their outer circle as a battlefield and inner circle as an operation base. 49 Individuals or corporations expect the family and fellow circles to assume the
role of an operation base. When the Japan circle is observed from the
vantage point of the world perspective, Japan itself is also considered
an operation base. These multi-layered inner circles may be conceptualized as multiple operation bases. Japanese think of the inner circle
as a place to gain strength for the next battle and develop strategies
for increasingly turbulent environments. 5 0 The configuration of bat147. See DONALD BLACK, Tim BEHAVIOR OF LAW (1976); HoRwrrz, supra note 33.

148. The concepts of "battlefield" and "operation base" are adapted from Kyogoku.
KYOGOKU, supra note 78, at 191-204. This dichotomy is similar to that of "soto" (outside)

and "uchi" (inside). NAKANE, supra note 81, at 47-54. Takeo Doi explained this dichotomy in terms of "reserved attitudes." Just as the operation base is multi-layered, so is ucil.

In the most intimate uchi, the family circle, any reservation of attitudes is not required,
because of amae (benevolence by parents to accept behavior of their children and excessive dependence by the children on their parents). See Doi, supra note 78, at 3843.
149. For example, when the fellow circle is recognized as a battlefield, the family circle

takes the role of an operation base. When there is significant competition among the
members of the fellow circle, individuals look for peace of mind in the family circle.

150. KYoGOKU, supra note 78, at 218. This principle of free competition is justified by
the Japanese work ethic. Many Japanese believe that work is one of the most important
"ways" or "paths" to reach something sacred or the ultimate reality. This belief can be
found most clearly in the Buddhism of Shosan Suzuki (1579-1620) or the Confucianism of

Baigan Ishida (1685-1744). According to Suzuki, all people, whether peasants, merchants,
priests, or warriors, can enter Nirvana if they concentrate on their own calling with sincerity and faithfulness. SUzuKI SHOSAN, SUZUKI SHOsAN DojiN ZENsHU [Tim COMPLErE
WoRKs oF PRIEsr SHOSAN Suzuxi] 61-72 (1962). Ishida also believed that commerce can
unify individual 'microcosm' with ultimate 'macrocosm.' Whatever work people do, if they

work honestly and earnestly, their work becomes an ideal way to fulfill their potentials. 1
ISHIDA BA GAN, ISmDA BAIGAN ZEmNHU [Ti

CoMPLETE WORKS OF BAiGAN IsHDA]

(1956); Y~mAmoro SHIcHwIE, NIHON SHI-ONSHuoI NO SELsHIN [Si'uuT OF THm JAPA-

NES E CAPrrALISM] 125-31, 142-56 (1979).
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tlefields is similar. The world circle is perceived to be a battlefield for
the Japan, fellow, and family circles. The Japan circle is also considered to be a battlefield for the fellow and family circles. Implicit or
explicit competition among brothers, friends, and colleagues suggests
that the family and fellow circles also can be battlefields. These multilayered inner circles are "multiple battlefields." '
Agents strive to achieve wealth, power, market share, competitive advantage, and other indicia of success in these battlefields.
Achievements and advancements result in tangible recognition within
the inner circles. This recognition for achievement and advancement
serves as a strong reinforcement for pro-social action. It fosters commitment and investment in conventional activities and allegiance to
common values.
2. Proactive Function - Deterrence
The inner circle's role in deterring normative violation may be
traced to concerns over damage to both personal and group reputation.151 Thus, if agents in the outer circles are accused of wrongdoing,
both their reputation and the groups to which they belong may be
damaged. Where reputational damage is significant, agents risk losing
their operation bases (e.g., the fellow circle). Individuals are deterred
from normative and law violation for fear that their actions might be
publicly exposed.'5 2 Once misconduct is revealed, an individual faces
inevitable shame and dishonor. An individual's wrongdoing also tarnishes the name of his corporation. 53 If the misconduct damages a
corporate image or reputation, forced retirement o:r resignation is
likely to follow.
Corporations are similarly reluctant to violate laws and norms. A
corporation fears public exposure of illegal loans, bribery, political
fraud, consumer fraud, insider-trading, defective products, and environmental violations. 54 Once disclosed, the corporation and its industrial group face dishonor. With serious normative violations, other
corporations in the fellow circle might encourage or even force corpo151. See JoHN

BRAIrHwArrE, CRIME, SHAME, AND REINTEGRATION

(1989).

152. Id.
153. Hiroshi Wagatsuna & Arthur Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in Japan and the United States, 20 LAW & Soc. REv. 461 (Robert Kidder ed., 1986).

154. See Laufer & Cohen, supra note 113.
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rate restructuring. 5 Executives who fail to take responsibility for
their actions are ostracized from the corporation's fellow circle.
Throughout this part, we have focused our attention on concentric circles as disincentives for norm violation. This is its proactive
function. Below we will consider its reactive function in the context of
multiple social hierarchies and efforts to engage in mediation. 1 m
3. Reactive Function-Mediation
The framework of concentric circles promotes harmony (wa)
through the mediation and conciliation of conflicts.'5 The prognosis
for successful mediation is determined by: (1) the presence of strong
ties or bonds between conflicting parties, (2) the sharing of common
normative constraints and cross-linkages, (3) the extent to which the
parties are of equal status and have comparable power in a shared
social hierarchy, and (4) the parties' commitment to long-term
relationships.158
In concentric circles, long-standing relationships are formed in
multiple social hierarchies that have a distinct internal organization
and ranking.159 All norm-violative actions are subjected1 to a host of
constraints imposed by relationships in these hierarchies. 60
155. Individuals who engage in unethical or criminal behavior for the sake of the corporation are often allowed to remain in the circle without any formal authority. Consider, for
example, the former president of All Nippon Airlines (ANA), Tokuji Wakasa, who resigned as president after his participation in the Lockheed ScandaL Wakasa has remained
with ANA, even after his guilt was established, due to his popularity with ANA's rankand-file. ANA, after changing its certificate of incorporation, appointed Wakasa to a new
ceremonial post (honorary chairman). Wakasa remained in his fellow circle, losing only
the formal power. Zen Nikku 'Post Wakasa' ni Fuan [ANA Worries About Post Wakasa
Regime], NiHoN KEIZmA

SHNBuN, Sept. 19, 1992, at 10.

156. The "conciliatory model" proposed by Horwitz is very similar to this mediatorcentered one, because in this model conflicts are not resolved through the imposition of
sanctions; rather, they are resolved through mutual bargaining between disputing parties
with the assistance of a mediator. HoRwrrz, supra note 33, at 65.
157. See CoNucr rN JAPAN (Ellis S. Krauss et al. eds., 1983); Susan J. Pharr, Resolving
Social Conflicts: a ComparativeView ofInterpersonalandInter-group Relationsin Japan, in
CONsTRucrs FOR UNDERSrANDiNG JAPAN 228-58 (Yoshio Sugimoto & Ross E. Mouer

eds., 1989).
158. See HoRwrrz, supra note 33, at 65-76.

159. See N
E supra note 81, at 28-40. Nakane considers hierarchy as providing the
fundamental structure and core of vertical organizations. See also HENDRY, supra note 89,
at 70 ("HIerarchical ranking runs through Japanese life, ordering individuals, groups, institutions, material objects, even foods, but at any particular level there will be a certain
equality as well").
160. See, e.g., supra note 157.
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a. Social Hierarchy
The contribution of a social hierarchy to conflict resolution (social control) is determined by the hierarchy's convergence. Agents
generally perceive interest groups in the fellow circle to be arranged in
a hierarchical fashion. For example, the hierarchy governing Japanese
business consists of business federations, industrial organizations, corporate groups, leading corporations, medium-sized companies, and
small businesses. 161 Even within a corporation, employees are distributed vertically within the corporate hierarchy.16 2 The bureaucracy
and political parties also have distinct hierarchical structures. 163 Politicians view their political fellows as hierarchically ordered groups, including interest groups, leaders of political factions, Diet members,
governors, mayors, and village headmen. 164
Conflict resolution is practiced in social hierarchies that have distinct rankings. 65 Thus, if employees fail to resolve a conflict, they
may ask a supervisor to mediate their interests. If there is no resolution, then the workers may turn to a mid-level manager. If the manager is unsuccessful, then senior management may intervene. In some
extreme cases, the Ministry of Labor might be urged to take action. A
similar process takes place when there are conflicts within local communities. Here, a voluntary caretaker often determines the primacy
and priority of interests. If the caretaker cannot mediate, for
whatever reason, a local politician may be asked to settle the dispute.
Finally, a leader of a political faction might try to resolve the
conflict.

1 66

161. See NAKANE, supra note 81, at 28-40.
162. Id

163. See SMrrl, supra note 99.
164. A comparable hierarchy is found where parties share similar backgrounds (e.g.,

membership in the same community, corporate group, industry, or btueau of the government). For example, three employees who belong to different companies in the same vertical keiretsu may appear in the same or similar hierarchical ordering. Westermann and
Burfeind describe hierarchy as one of the core characteristics of Japan. TED D. WEsTER-

Two SocfiEms: JAPAN AND THE
not based on class but on institutions that become the focal point of status distinctions. According to Nakane, Japanese
society sets a hierarchical order among people with the same qualifications in the same
group (i.e., age, tenure, and education become important in the ranking processes).
NAKANE, supra note 81, at 70.
MANN & JAMES W. BuPsEIND, CRImE AND JusTIcE IN
UNrrED STATES 22, 23 (1991). Yet, the stratification is

165. See RODNEY

CLARK,

TAE

JAPANESE COMPANY

166. See generally HENDRY, supra note 89.

(1979).
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b. Overlapped Hierarchy
In Japan, virtually all hierarchies are connected in some way.167
Because interest groups in a fellow circle often constitute part of other
fellow circles, the hierarchy of each fellow circle is likely to share constituencies. Therefore, even if each disputant belongs to different hierarchies, members of the hierarchies most often have a significant
and meaningful connection with one another. For example, an executive of a local company who belongs to the fellow circle of a nationwide corporation might be a member of the supporter association of a
politician as well as a member of the shingikai organized by the bureaucracy. In such a case, the executive has multiple constituencies in
a number of hierarchies. Corporate groups, and particularly vertical
keiretsu, have their own hierarchies.'6
Commentators, such as Professor Upham, have observed a bureaucratic informalism in Japan. 69 This informalism is underwritten
by a consensus among citizens that bureaucratic intervention and informal coordination are necessary and meaningful. Informalism is accepted by government as well.' 70 "The Japanese government," claims
Upham, "has attempted to prevent the development of litigation into
an effective and ongoing vehicle for social change." 171 Within the
framework of concentric circles, any intervention is perceived as a natural response to the parties, expectations of the bureaucracy. Comparable intervention is found at almost every level of the Japanese
society. Coordination and mediation may be found not only at the
national level, but also in local communities, private enterprises, religious organizations, universities, sport clubs, families, and even among
friends. Notably, mediation of conflict is entirely consensual. Even if
the bureaucracy desired to engage in a coercive social control, it
would be unsuccessful.172 Consequently, the bureaucracy acts in a
manner that is consistent with the interests of all stakeholders-one
that produces the most harmonious resolution. 73
167. See generally SMrrH, supra note 99.

168. See TnE JAPANSE FiRM (Masahiko Aoki & Ronald Dore eds., 1994). Private
corporations or industries, in particular, view the government as occupying the highest
position in the industrial hierarchies. The government is also perceived as an important
interconnection among different hierarchies. TsuRuTA, supra note 137.
169. UPiHA,

supra note 17, at 166-204.

170. I& at 166.
171. 1I at 18.

172. Id. at 17.
173. "Harmony" is of great importance for Japanese people. As Kyogoku has explained, after World War II when Japan learned of "democracy," ordinary Japanese viewed
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c. Stable Hierarchy

Tied to the notion of long-term reciprocity and the harmonious
mediation of conflicts is a stable hierarchy (i.e., a hierarchy that is not
temporary or transitory). 174 Stability in hierarchies is visible in the
political community, where, even after resigning from office, politicians remain influential, perhaps more so than when they held office.
In the business community, a comparable phenomenon exists.
many presidents and
After formally retiring from their corporations,
175
directors continue to hold significant power.
Organizational agents such as administrative agencies, bureaus,
political factions, private companies, and corporate subdivisions also
tend to maintain their social relations and exert influence over their
agents. For example, if a newly elected Cabinet revises industrial
strategies, MITI cannot radically change its traditional industrial policies because of its own long-standing relations with certain industries.
Even after the top management of a corporation is reshuffled, corporate subdivisions most often find it difficult to alter their relations with
other fellow companies. Perhaps most importantly, the existence of a
stable hierarchy allows the mediator to establish a long-term balance
among conflicting parties. Insofar as the mediator has played a role in
prior mediations with the same parties, a proposal may be fashioned
to appropriately consider the disputants' history. A long-standing institutional memory of each company, division, or office allows for equitable mediation. 176
democracy as "the principle of harmony" by which "everybody gets along well together."
See KYOoOKU, supra note 78, at 281-84. As Egami explains: "Compared with Christian
mythology, Japanese mythology is very different. In Christianity, the world is completely
synthesized with an absolute God who stands at a central point where a standard of good
and evil is made clear. On the contrary, in Japanese mythology, because Amaterasu and
Susanou [Japanese ancient goddess and god] are opposing each other, [ancient literature]
does not show any standard of good and evil at a central point. In Japanese mythology,
opposition between good and evil balance each other. If we call the structure of Christian
mythology a centrally unified type, then Japanese mythology may be called a chuku kinko
[balanced-vacuum] type." Nihon Minzoku to Nihon Bunka [JapanesePeople and Culture]
430 (Egami, N. ed., 1989).
174. Consider the cases of Takuei Tanaka (the former Prime Minister) and Shin
Kanemaru (the former Vice President of the LDP). Although both lost formal power, they
could still affect the decision-making processes of the LDP and the Japanese government,
simply because they once ruled their own political faction. Even after resigning, political
leaders can use their relationships and political networks. This is true, to a certain degree,
HABATSU NO KENKYU
with most roles within Japanese society. YAMAMOTO SmCMH-MH,
[A STUDY OF FACTION] 259-66 (1989).

175. See, ag., H. PAUL VARi.y, JAPANESE CULTuRE (3d ed. 1984).
176. See UPHAM, supra note 17, at 204.
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IV. REGULATORY COMPLIANCE, CONCENTRIC
CIRCLES, AND ESCs
In Part III, we concluded that the regulatory environment in Japan is characterized by strong proactive and reactive social controls;
that concentric circles guide a complex system of normative constraints and influences; that the flexibility of AG reflects the informality and consensus-driven nature of industrial regulation in Japan; and
that mediation in the context of hierarchies provides the basis for conflict resolution. We also noted that ESCs have been applied inconsistently, non-strategically, and with unnecessary formality. These
observations and conclusions make it difficult, if not impossible, to
expect lasting change from existing U.S.-initiated ESCs, no matter
how well intentioned.
U.S. policy assumes that a greater reliance on formal controls is
necessary to combat anticompetitive behavior. This assumption has
been supported, implicitly or explicitly, in two ways. First, it has been
argued that the availability and certainty of sanctions for failures to
comply with existing laws will underwrite the effectiveness of informal
law enforcement. Professor Haley, for example, has adopted
Braithwaite's view that informal law enforcement or regulation in Japan is largely ineffective without the prospect of responsive sanctions.! 7 Second, an increasing reliance on formal sanctions is justified
by adopting a normative conceptualization championed by Comte,
Durkheim, and Cooley at the turn of the twentieth century. 178 According to this view, the need for more formal social control is required by societal relations that become increasingly complex. As
society evolves and personal or intimate relations are replaced by impersonal, contractual relations, there is a burgeoning of self-interest.
As Ross noted, the "natural bonds, that were so many and firm when
the rural neighborhood or village community was the type of aggregation, no longer bind men as they must be bound in the huge and com179
plex aggregates of the day."'
With such development, Ross maintains that instinctive and informal social controls, like empathy, sociability, a sense of equity, and
solidarity, become insufficient to control and curb self-interest. Thus,
177. See Haley, supra note 9, at 114.
178. See C.H. COOLEY, SocIA ORGANIZATiON (1909); WnI.wt GiMHAM SUtN'ER,
OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE OF USAGES, MANNERS, CUS.
TomS, MORES, AND MORALS (1906); A. B. Hollingshead, The Concept of Social Control,6
AM. Soc. REv. 217-24 (1941).
179. E.A. Ross, SOCIAL CONTROL 433 (1901).

FoLKwAYs: A STUDY

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 18:487

as natural communities mature into artificial societies, the regulation
of conduct to quell temptation and resist succumbing to unethical opportunities demands a means of control that is more formal and systematic. Quite simply, with societal institutions requiring complex
economic transactions and producing an amalgam of private interests,
an artificial order is required to offset the increasing weakness of the
natural order.
Both of these arguments are unpersuasive. The effectiveness of
proactive and reactive constraints in Japan, discussed in Part III, do
not hinge on the availability and certainty of law enforcement. Social
control emerges from a host of relationships, interactions, practices,
and policies that reflect, but are not determined by, the presence of
law and vigilant law enforcement. There is little doubt that the effectiveness of consensual governance would be compromised, in time, by
strict adherence to formal controls and procedures. 180 The normative
view that an artificial order, derived from formal social control, is necessary to offset weakening informal controls is also inconsistent with
the persuasive influence and authority of concentric circles. Below we
argue that the preferred solution to antitrust and anticompetitive behavior will not be found through increased reliance oa law or initiatives that are designed to cause such reliance. Rather, such behavior
should be addressed with extraterritorial initiatives that serve to
strengthen the proactive and reactive controls of Japan's informal regulatory environment.
A.

ESCs and Concentric Circles

Extraterritorial initiatives designed to increase reliance on law
and law enforcement and diminish reliance on administrative guidance underestimate the place of normative consensus and cooperation in concentric circles. Further, the use of ]ESCs fails to
acknowledge the reliance of Japan's regulatory culture on a host of
normative relationships that underwrite the family, quasi-family, fellow, Japan, and world circles. From basic familial relations to administrative guidance and the formation of cooperative industrial
associations, cognitive and institutional norms are grounded in alliances that promote powerful social controls. The force of these alliances, and the strength of social control are maintained by reciprocal
relationships and exchanges that encourage consensus building, cooperation, and mediation (see Table 3).
180. See, eg., Spaeth, supra note 18.
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Table 3
Concentric Circles as Social Control
PROACrvE SOCIAL CONMROL

Rvcrwv SOCIAL
CONmOL

CoGNrrrvE NoRms

Commitment to long-term reciprocity;,
sense of common identity and cultural
background; subordination of interests;
strong pressure to balance debts.

CLOsE Busnuss
RELATIONSHIPS

Desire for inclusion within circle;
maintenance of corporate relations

AND PRACricEs

through gifts and entertainment;

TRIANGULAR
RELA-TIONSHPS

OPERATION BAsE
A BATrLEFBm
DETERRENCE
MEDIATION

encouraging the formation of
cooperative associations; coalition
building;, cross-shareholding as evidence
of trust and loyalty;, building of longterm business relationships.
Interrelations between business,
politicians, and government; reciprocity
in relations; granting of favors;
calculation of debts and credits; strong
efforts by triumvirate to foster industrial
growth.
Common goal of achieving wealth,
power, and advantage; desire for
recognition; fostering commitment and
allegiance to common values.
Concerns over loss of reputation,
employment, and status; powerful
pressure of conformity.

IN

SOCIAL
HiE.AgcHr s

Conciliatory

control; mutual
bargaining to an
agreeable outcome
in the context of a
social hierarchy;
influence and
constraint of
hierarchy on
disputes;
harmonious
mediation within
I hierarchy.

B. The Effectiveness and Wisdom of ESCs
Given these strong normative constraints, the objectives of ESCs
should be revised and the initiatives redirected. Instead of threatening legal action and economic sanctions to promote reliance on law,
extraterritorial initiatives should use the power and authority of ex-
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isting proactive'social controls in Japan to promote aggressive corporate, as well as industry, self-regulation and compliance. 181
Specifically, ESCs should require constructive action from four con-

stituent groups: corporations, industrial associations, ministries, and
new organizations designed to promote regulatory compliance. For
example, antitrust compliance manuals should be compiled by corporations from all sectors, from manufacturers to retailers and service
firms. Corporations should provide employee education programs on
antitrust compliance.' 82 Industrial associations should follow the lead
of the Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) and Federation of Bankers Association in drafting general and sector antitrust
compliance guidelines. In addition, model compliance programs
should be developed. 183 Next, government ministries, such as MITI
and JFTC, should use the leverage that inheres in business-government relations to urge corporate compliance. The strength of regulatory policy will be determined by the legitimacy given to existing
antitrust law by government agencies. The prognosis for reform
therefore turns on the way in which antitrust regulation is framed by
the bureaucracy. Agencies must stress the importance of antitrust
policy in bureaucratic interactions. Voluntary compliance by corporations is a product of negotiation and compromise. Ministries should
take a proactive role in preparing guidelines and compliance manuals,
sponsoring in-house seminars, and maintaining active antitrust oversight committees.'8 In addition, ministries should conduct inter-min181. This effort is different from the use of hierarchically escalating sanctions to encourage self regulation. See supra notes 11-27 and accompanying text.
182. Most Firms Trying to Observe Antimonopoly Law, Japan Economic Newswire,
Apr. 24, 1992, availablein LEXIS, World Library, Jen File (In a survey of 625 companies,
30% had already started to draft compliance manuals and 50% planned on doing so in the
future); Bankers Feel the Heat of Fair-TradeLaw; Employees Instructed in How to Comply
with Antitrust Statutes, NwCKo Wx~y, Oct. 26, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Nikkei File.
183. See e.g., Japanese Trust Banking Sector Adopts Antinonopoly Act Compliance
Guidelines,64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1616, at 656 (May 27,1993); Large
JapaneseBanks Take Steps to Adopt Antitrust Compliance Programs,63 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1583, at 402 (Sept. 24, 1992); Japanese Banking Group Develops
DraftAntitrust Compliance Program,62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (3NA) No. 1562, at
551 (Apr. 23, 1992) ("[S]elf-regulatory rules cover.., bank-to-bank meetings, lending,
deposit-taking, fees, and securities.").
184. See eg., The Antinonopoly Act Guidelines Concerning DistributionSystems and
Business Practices,supra note 58. See also, JapaneseMinistry Urges Glasv Makers to Revise
Antitrust Compliance Programs, 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1552, at 212
(Feb. 13, 1992); Japan's Economic PlanningAgency Urges Companies to Adopt Compliance Programs, 63 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1577, at 182 (Aug. 6, 1992).
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istry compliance training programs for procurement officiaIs. 185
Finally, ministries should form organizations to promote antitrust
compliance (e.g., the Construction Industry Fair Trade Promotion Organization). 8 6 Each of these initiatives has been attempted, in limited
efforts, within a specific industry or by a single ministry. ESCs should
prompt the widespread development of compliance manuals, adoption of compliance programs, and implementation of compliance education and training.
The rationale is not to use ESCs to advance a model of coregulation (i.e., industry-association-government self-regulation, where the
responsibility for rule-making and enforcement rests with industry or
industrial associations)." 7 It is also not an attempt to advance the
notion of enforced self-regulation, where regulated firms formulate
their own rules and standards, monitor compliance, and sanction noncompliance.ls1 Models of enforced self-regulation require public
monitoring of compliance, reliance on public law enforcement and adjudication, as well as a strategy of escalating governmental interventions where noncompliance continues.'8 9 The rationale is much more
modest. ESCs should target corporations, industrial associations, ministries, and compliance organizations to promote the efficient use of
the proactive social control mechanisms found in concentric circles.
ESCs that press regulated firms and industries to codify compliance
standards, adopt compliance procedures, and provide compliance
training, recognize the strong potential and unique character of Japan's consensus-based regulatory system. Using extraterritorial initiatives to strengthen the very relationships and alliances that underwrite
the regulatory environment acknowledges the integrity, as well as the
legitimacy, of the government's commitment to antitrust regulation.
The persistent use of inconsistent rule-based ESCs, in contrast, will
For a discussion of the activity of the Economic Planning Agency, see HAHN, supra note 6,
at 115.

185. See JFTC Will Give Compliance Training to Public Officials in Procurement 66
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1646, at 32 (Jan. 13, 1994).
186. See JapaneseConstruction MinistryForms Organizationto PromoteCompliance 63
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1584, at 432 (Oct. 1, 1992).
187. See PETER GRABosKy & JOHN BRArHWAITE, OF MATrES GENTE: ENFORCEMirENr STRATEGIES OF AUSTRAIAN BusINESS REGULATORY AONcsms (1986); Alan C.
Page, FizancialServices: The Self Regulatory Alternative, in REGULATIO AND PUBLIC
LAW (Robert Baldwin & Christopher McCrudden eds., 1987); JoHN BRAiwAITE, To
PUNISH OR PERSUADE: ENFoRcE w OF COAL MINE SAFrY
188. See AYRES & BRArrHwArm, supra note 12, at 102-03.

189. 1i

(1985).
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likely result in a symbolic reliance on law, symbolic shifts in regulatory
policies, and negligible increases in prosecutions.
C. ExtraterritorialPromotion of Informal Versus FormalLaw
Enforcement
Using ESCs to promote informal versus formal law enforcement
will be seen by some as imprudent, if not naive. 190 After all, there is
much agreement that with all of the advantages of AG and consensual
regulation, the single most significant limitation is its "lack of ability
to enforce its aim." 191 To some, its primary virtue-bargained-for discretionary regulation-is also its primary vice. This observation has
led to the generally accepted conclusion that informal enforcement of
regulatory policy is effective to the extent that it is supported by the
possibility of definite sanctions. 192 Commentators, in turn, have suggested variations of responsive regulation or pyramid regulatory enforcement, where compliance is seen as a function of the capacity for
regulatory escalation and the potency of sanctions. 193 We argue that
this suggestion, and the conclusion on which it is based, underestimates deference to authority in Japan; the strong cultural preference
for cooperation, consensus, and social guidance; and the fear of retaliatory bureaucratic regulation by corporations and industries where
noncompliance continues. 94 Moreover, the effort to promote a responsive regulatory system in Japan disregards the following facts: (1)
that both formal and informal law enforcement mechanisms offer distinct limitations in terms of compliance; 95 (2) that responsive regulation generally requires rule-based regulatory environments; 196 and (3)
190. Cf. John 0. Haley, Introduction: Legal Versus Social Controls, 71 L. JAPAN 1

(1984).
191. Takashi Wakiyama, The Nature and Tools of Japan's IndustrialPolicy, 27 HARV.
INT' L.J. 471 (1986).

192. See Haley, supra note 9; Young, supra note 20, at 950 ("Noncompliance with administrative guidance that a regulated party finds unpalatable occurs most commonly when
the agency is either unwilling or unable to resort to its collateral enforcement powers.").
193. Haley, supra note 9.
194. See Hiroshi, supra note 24, at 71 ("Although compliance is technically voluntary,
guidance often becomes compulsory because of the substantial power wielded by the administrative authorities behind it.").
195. See Mark Cohen, The Role of CriminalSanctions in Antitrust Enforcement, 7 CoN.
Trnm,. PoL. IssuEs 36 (1989).

196. See AYRas & BnRnArrn , supra note 12.
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that promoting resort to formal law enforcement runs a risk of undermining the primacy and authority of existing informal controls. 197
The most significant of all the concerns with promoting formal
law enforcement is the risk that the value associated with administrative consultation, advice, persuasion, and pressure would diminish as
compliance becomes a simple function of the capacity for regulatory
escalation and formal sanction.'98 One must ask whether there is a
definite risk that formal social controls (formal law enforcement), introduced to supplement consensual governance, would undermine informal controls. Theories of rational choice, applied by some
commentators to prove the value of formal social controls, suggest
that this risk is very real.199
Finally, it is worthwhile asking if it is wise to use ESCs as a vehicle to promote reliance on formal social controls in a country that is
regulated almost entirely by informal controls.2°° Despite all of the
criticism and professed weaknesses of consensual governance, few
constructive proposals have been offered to strengthen existing informal controls without resort to law.
V. CONCLUSION
On April 13, 1992, following a competition policy seminar in Tokyo sponsored by the JFTC, James F. Rill, Chief of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, observed: "One central theme...
is that there's a common commitment to effective competition policy
in both nations. And central to the effective development of competition policy is strong enforcement of laws dealing with competition." '
Rill's comments, made shortly after a Department of Justice policy
decision that extended the reach of U.S. antitrust law to foreign busi197. See FREDA ADLER, NATIONS No- OBSESSED wmi CRME (1983); WESrER.tANN
& BuRFIEND, supra note 164.
198. Cf Haley, Luck, Law, Culture, and Trade, supra note 8, at 416-17.

199. See Haley, supra note 9, at 113 ("Compliance with formal law enforcement involves a similar balancing of gains and costs by the respondents. In deciding whether to
comply with an informal, nonbinding request by government officials, the respondent balances the advantages against the disadvantages.").

200. Robert I. Smith, Lawyers, Litigiousness, and the Law in Japan,11 CoRma.L. F. 53
(1984) ("Contemporary Japan remains a place where the family, neighborhood, and work
place yield formidable sanctions over the behavior of individuals. Loyalty, obedience, deference to authority, acquiescence, and group identity are powerful deterrents to
misbehavior.").
201. Government-Business Mission to Japan Focuses on Urging Anti-Cartel Enforcement, 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1561, at 522 (Apr. 16, 1992).
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ness conduct, reflects a widely-held view that Japan must increase its
reliance on the criminal enforcement of antimonopoly law.
In this article, we have concluded that effective competition policy is most likely to be found in the informal nature of Japanese consensual regulation. ESCs should actively promote self-regulation, as
well as industry compliance. The alliances and relationships that serve
as a foundation for the socio-cultural environment hi Japan will ensure the effectiveness of self-regulation and compliance. As long as
the foundation of Japan's regulatory environment reflects a commitment to consensus, long-term reciprocity, mediation, and hierarchy,
attempts by the U.S. to impose a rule-centered model of regulation,
through inconsistent ESCs, will only result in an infrequent and symbolic reliance on law.

